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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 23, 2001, Aaron Haynes coerced Terance Johnson into 
helping him and an associate rob a bank in Memphis, Tennessee.1  
Haynes had previously bullied, intimidated, and threatened to kill 
Johnson, including incidents in which Haynes had pointed a gun at 
Johnson, arranged to have Johnson beaten up, and repeatedly taken 
Johnson’s money from him by force.2  On the day of the robbery, 
Haynes threatened to kill Johnson if Johnson did not follow Haynes’s 
instructions.3  Johnson complied with Haynes’s instructions, assisting 
Haynes and accomplice William Maxwell in robbing the bank. 
During the bank robbery, Haynes shot and killed bank customer Sheryl 
Lynn White.4  Johnson played no direct role in Ms. White’s death.  Haynes, 
Maxwell, and Johnson were all arrested and charged with bank robbery 
as well as felony murder for the death of Ms. White.5
 1. Order Granting In Part and Denying in Part Government’s Motions in Limine 
at 1-2, United States v. Johnson (Terance Johnson), 416 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2005) (No. 
01-20247) [hereinafter Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order]. 
 2. Id. at 3; Brief of Appellant at 12-13, Terance Johnson, 416 F.3d 464 (No. 01-
20247) (citing trial transcripts); Order Denying Defendant’s Motions for a Downward 
Departure from Sentencing Guidelines and for Reconsideration at 10, Terance Johnson, 
416 F.3d 464 (No. 01-20247) [hereinafter Terance Johnson Sentencing Order]. 
 3. Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order, supra note 1, at 3. 
 4. Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order, supra note 1, at 2. 
 5. Id. at 1-2.  The actual charges arose under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), (h)(2) 
(2000) (bank robbery); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), (h)(2) (causing a death in the course of a 
bank robbery); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), (3) (2000) (using and carrying a firearm in relation 
to a bank robbery); and 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) and (j)(2) (causing a death through the use of 
a firearm).  Id.  Because all that is required for a conviction under § 2113(e) is proof that 
the defendant committed the predicate felony and a death (intentional or accidental) 
resulted, the § 2113(e) charge is equivalent to a traditional charge of felony murder.  See 
Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order, supra note 1, at 6. 
At the insistence of Aaron Haynes, Terance Johnson shot a bank security guard 
nonfatally.  Id. at 2.  Because the security guard did not die, there was no felony murder 
charge involving the guard.  The government did not bring a separate assault charge 
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Terance Johnson is mentally retarded.  Examinations held for the 
purposes of trial yielded an I.Q. score of sixty-six.6  His mental age 
ranges between six and ten years, and he has the functioning capacity of 
a child in grade school.7  Expert witnesses testified, and the district court 
found, that mentally retarded individuals like Johnson are “especially 
susceptible to coercion,” and “suffer from a diminished ability to think 
of and choose alternative courses of action.”8
Despite determining that Johnson was mentally retarded and that 
“Haynes coerced him to commit the robbery,”9 the district court excluded 
all evidence relating to Haynes’s coercion and Johnson’s retardation.  
Drawing upon the traditional rule that the common-law defense of 
duress does not apply to a charge of murder, the district court ruled that 
any evidence of duress was irrelevant as a matter of law to the felony 
murder charge.10  The question of duress might theoretically be relevant 
at sentencing under this approach.  But since the relevant federal statute 
set a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment,11 that would not 
serve to help Terance Johnson.  Thus, although there was no factual 
dispute that Haynes threatened to kill Johnson if Johnson did not obey his 
instructions and assist in robbing the bank, the criminal justice system was 
barred from considering this undisputed fact at any stage of the case. 
The court also ruled that the duress defense involved an objective 
standard regarding the elements that the defendant (a) be faced with an 
immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm and (b) have no 
opportunity to avoid the danger.12  That is, the defendant must not 
simply perceive a threat, but rather must be faced with an actual threat; 
according to the district court, even a mistaken perception that is 
nonetheless reasonable would be insufficient.  Similarly, it would not be 
enough for the defendant to believe (even reasonably) that there is no 
against Terance Johnson regarding the bank guard shooting, and during the course of the 
litigation this shooting played no part in the legal issues discussed in this article.  See id. 
at 1-2 (stating the charges brought against Johnson). 
 6. Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order, supra note 1, at 3.  An I.Q. of seventy or 
under indicates retardation. 
 7. Terance Johnson Sentencing Order, supra note 2, at 6. 
 8. Id. at 9, 11. 
 9. Id. at 12. 
 10. Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order, supra note 1, at 4-8. 
 11. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (2000). 
 12. For a discussion of the elements of the duress defense, see infra Part II. 




opportunity to avoid the danger; rather, it must be the case that no such 
opportunity in fact exists.13
Rather than go to trial under these evidentiary restrictions, Terance 
Johnson entered into a conditional guilty plea.  The defendant pled guilty 
to the charges, conditioned on his right to appeal the two evidentiary 
rulings described immediately above.14  The case went up to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on two issues: (1) whether duress 
is an applicable defense to a charge of felony murder; and (2) whether 
evidence of a defendant’s mental retardation is relevant to a defense of 
duress. 
On August 5, 2005, the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s 
rulings.15  The court left undecided the first question of whether duress 
could apply to felony murder.  Instead, the court affirmed on the 
alternate ground that Terance Johnson had failed to present a prima facie 
case on the duress defense.  Because Johnson was left alone with the gun 
for some period of time while Haynes parked the car, the Sixth Circuit 
decided that any reasonable jury would have to find that Johnson had a 
“reasonable opportunity” to escape Haynes’s coercive influence.  Since 
such a reasonable alternative is inconsistent with the elements of the 
duress defense, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Johnson lacked sufficient 
evidence to present that defense to the jury.16
 13. Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order, supra note 1, at 13. 
 14. Plea Agreement at 1-2, United States v. Johnson (Terance Johnson), 416 F.3d 
464 (6th Cir. 2005) (No. 01-20247) [hereinafter Terance Johnson Plea Agreement].   
 15. Terance Johnson, 416 F.3d at 470. 
 16. Id. at 468-69.  The opinion failed to address the amicus argument that because 
Haynes lived in Johnson’s neighborhood and had been to his home many times, 
Johnson’s reasonable fear of Haynes’s retaliation for noncompliance would last past the 
day of the robbery itself, undercutting the utility of simply running away from the 
robbery scene. 
The lack of a prima facie case on duress was an alternate ground relied upon by the 
district court to supplement its legal ruling that duress could not be asserted against a 
felony murder charge.  Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order, supra note 1, at 9-12.  This 
ruling on the government’s motion in limine to exclude duress evidence came without an 
evidentiary hearing and precluded Johnson’s entire defense.  See generally id.  It raises 
troubling procedural issues regarding the defendant’s right to remain silent and put the 
government to its burden of proof; the right to present evidence and confront witnesses; 
and the right to a jury trial.  Indeed, the mere requirement that defendant respond to this 
motion by proffering evidence raises troubling issues about defendant’s right to silence, 
possible subversion of the normal rules limiting discovery in criminal cases, and defense 
counsel’s work product privilege. Such issues have received some scholarly attention.  
See Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing 
the Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (1987); Douglas L. Colbert, The 
Motion In Limine: Trial Without Jury—A Government’s Weapon Against The Sanctuary 
Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 52-54, 70-77 (1986).  While intriguing, these issues 
are outside the scope of this article. 
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On the second issue, the Sixth Circuit ruled that evidence of mental 
retardation was not relevant to a duress defense.17  The court ruled that 
consideration of an individual defendant’s retardation would defeat the 
objective nature of the “reasonable person” standard involved in the 
elements of duress.18  The panel opinion did not clarify whether this 
“objective” standard allowed for reasonable mistakes by a defendant 
regarding the existence of a threat or the impossibility of safely refusing 
the coercer’s demands, nor did it refer at all to the district court’s ruling 
that a reasonable mistake by a defendant would not be sufficient to meet 
the objective standard of the duress elements. 
Both of these main issues are questions of first impression in the 
federal courts.  No federal court has ruled on the applicability of duress 
to felony murder.  A few state courts have so ruled, with mixed results.19  
Prior to the August 2005 ruling in the Terance Johnson case, no federal 
court has ruled on the relevance (if any) of mental retardation in meeting 
the elements of duress.  A few federal courts have ruled in the analogous 
area of “battered women’s syndrome,” with mixed results.20
Scholarship on the defense of duress is sparse.  Some attention has 
been given to the general question of whether there should be a duress 
defense to intentional murder,21 but none to the distinct question of 
whether it should be a defense to (non-intentional) felony murder, let 
alone the question of the relevance of mental retardation to the defense.  
This scholarship includes some discussion of cases involving the 
background of war, and the special type of duress that war provides.22  
These cases raise the question of the relevance of coercion when military 
personnel follow orders—a question of increasing salience amid the 
recent controversies concerning the mistreatment of prisoners by U.S. 
military personnel.23
 17. Terance Johnson, 416 F.3d at 466. 
 18. Id. at 469. 
 19. See infra notes 117-126 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra Part V.B.4. 
 21. See Terance Johnson Plea Agreement, supra note 14, and infra text 
accompanying note 29. 
 22. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity & 
Duress, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 861 (2003); Valerie Epps, The Soldier’s Obligation to Die 
When Ordered to Shoot Civilians or Face Death Himself, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 987 
(2003). 
 23. Stephen Hedges, Report Cites Larger Role of Military Intelligence in Prisoner 
Abuse, CHICAGO TRIB., Aug. 26, 2004, at C1; Thomas Crampton, U.S. Officers Tied to 




This article reexamines the defense of duress, both generally and in 
specific contexts raised by the Terance Johnson case.  Part II provides 
general background on the defense, and distinguishes it from the related 
common-law defense of “necessity.”  Part III argues for a reversal of the 
common-law rule categorically barring assertion of the defense to the 
crime of murder.  It explains that while a threat to a defendant’s life may 
never justify the act of killing an innocent person, it may excuse a 
defendant from responsibility for that wrongful act.  Part IV argues that 
even if the law bars the use of duress as a defense to murder, that rule 
should not apply to a charge of felony murder, especially where the 
coerced defendant played no direct part in the killing.  Among other 
things, such a result follows from the basic rule that duress can excuse 
the predicate felony, and liability for the predicate felony is a 
prerequisite to felony murder liability.  Part V argues that duress allows 
for reasonable mistakes regarding the presence of a threat and the 
absence of lawful alternatives.  It also argues that evidence of mental 
retardation and other cognizable physical and mental disabilities should 
be relevant under the duress defense’s “reasonable person” standard. 
II.  BACKGROUND ON DURESS 
A.  General 
“Duress,” which is usually used synonymously with “coercion,”24 is a 
common-law defense available in the federal courts and those of many 
states.25  It excuses criminal conduct where “the actor was under an 
unlawful threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury, which threat 
caused the actor to engage in conduct violating the literal terms of the 
criminal law.”26  Otherwise unlawful conduct caused by such duress will 
excuse the crime in question “unless that crime consists of intentionally 
killing an innocent third person.”27
Iraqi Abuse, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Aug. 26, 2004, at 1; The Truth About Abu 
Ghraib, WASH. POST, July 29, 2005, at A22. 
 24. See United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 569 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977).  
“Duress” has also been used interchangeably with “compulsion” and “intimidation.”  See 
1A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE 
AND INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 19.02, at 758-59, 765 (2000). 
 25. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S 394, 409-11 (1980). 
 26. Id. at 409.  A leading criminal law treatise defines duress as: “A person’s 
unlawful threat (1) which causes the defendant reasonably to believe that the only way to 
avoid imminent death or serious bodily injury . . . is to engage in [unlawful] conduct . . . , 
and (2) which causes the defendant to engage in that conduct . . . .”  1 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.3, at 614 (1986). 
 27. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 614 (emphasis added). 
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A common formulation of the elements of the defense includes: 
(1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to the 
defendant (or in some cases, someone close to the 
defendant);28
(2) a well-grounded fear that the threat would be carried out; 
and 
(3) no reasonable opportunity to avoid the threatened harm.29
The defendant has an initial burden of producing sufficient evidence 
to raise the defense;30 if he does so, most courts would give the 
prosecution the burden of persuading the jury that the defendant did not 
meet the elements of the defense.31
Some courts would add an additional element that (4) the defendant 
did not recklessly place himself in a situation where he would face the 
threatened harm,32 or (5) there is a direct causal link between the 
threatened harm and the criminal act.33  While some cases discuss an 
additional element that the defendant promptly surrender himself to the 
authorities after avoiding the threatened harm, that element only applies 
where the defendant asserts the duress defense to a charge of unlawfully 
 28. See United States v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 1989) (suggesting 
that the threat can be against a family member); United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 
F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 24, at 755 
(Committee Comments on Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions) (stating that threat 
against third party is not limited to members of defendant’s family). 
 29. See United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 
United States v. Jennell, 749 F.2d 1302, 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)).  Similar elements can be 
seen in other opinions.  See United States v. King, 879 F.2d 137, 138-39 (4th Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Riffe, 28 
F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Toney, 27 F.3d 1245, 1248 (7th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Rawlings, 982 F.2d 590, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Scott, 901 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lee, 694 F.2d 649, 654 (11th 
Cir. 1983).  For a listing of the elements as set out by pattern jury instructions in the 
various federal circuits, see O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 24, at 749-50 (1st Cir.), 751 
(2d Cir.), 752 (4th Cir.), 753 (5th Cir.), 754 (6th Cir.), 758 (8th Cir.), 763 (9th Cir.), 770 
(10th Cir.), 771 (11th Cir.), 772 (D.C. Cir.). 
 30. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 412-13 n.9. 
 31. See Riffe, 28 F.3d at 568, 568 n.2; United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832, 
835-36 (2d Cir. 1983).  But see United States v. Domiguez-Mestas, 929 F.2d 1379, 1384 
(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that a defendant has a “preponderance of evidence” burden of 
persuasion). 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson (Terance Johnson), 416 F.3d 464, 468 (6th 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Blankenship, 67 F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 1995); Harper, 802 
F.2d at 117. 
 33. See, e.g., Terance Johnson, 416 F.3d at 468; Harper, 802 F.2d at 117. 




escaping from prison.34  This special element in escape cases makes 
sense because escape is a crime continuing in nature; the criminal 
offense continues until such time as the defendant surrenders. 
B.  Duress Versus Necessity 
The defense of “duress” is distinct from the defense of “necessity,” 
which is sometimes referred to as “justification.”  Generally, duress has 
been limited to situations involving threats from human sources, while 
necessity can also encompass threats from natural sources, such as rabid 
dogs or violent storms.35  This is also the approach taken by the Model 
Penal Code (MPC).36
More importantly, the necessity defense contains a “balance of 
harms” element: the harm caused by the defendant’s illegal act must be 
less than the harm which would have resulted had the defendant 
obeyed the law—as in the case of a mountain hiker who breaks into 
another’s cabin to avoid being frostbitten by a blizzard.37  By contrast, 
the duress defense does not include such a balance of harms.  Thus, if 
the defendant cuts off an innocent victim’s arm to avoid having his 
own arm cut off by a third party, the duress defense is still available, 
even though the harm defendant caused (the loss of an innocent third 
party’s arm) is not less than the harm defendant sought to avoid (the 
 34. See United States v. Solano, 10 F.3d 682, 683 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the 
duress defense does not have an express duty to surrender to the authorities outside of 
prison escape cases); United States v. Alicea, 837 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1988) (no 
express duty to surrender in a non-prison escape case, although in some cases such a 
duty might be implicit in the more general requirement that there be “no reasonable 
opportunity” to avoid the harm); Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410-11 (holding that this element of 
the defense exists “in the context of prison escape”); O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 24, at 
746, 752 (duty to surrender applies only in escape cases) (citing United States v. Sarno, 
24 F.3d 618, 622 (4th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 345-46 (2d 
Cir. 1983)). 
 35. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409-10; JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
LAW § 23.01, at 299-300 (3d ed. 2001). 
 36. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.02 cmt. at 16 (Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1985) [hereinafter MPC 1985] (explaining that the MPC 
“necessity” defense can apply to either natural or man-made threats, even where the 
man-made threats may create overlapping liability with the “duress” defense); 10A 
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED: MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(4), at 132 (West 2001) 
[hereinafter Uniform Laws, MPC] (applicability of necessity defense does not preclude 
applicability of duress defense). 
 37. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989); see also United 
States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984); DRESSLER, supra note 35, 
at 299-300.  But see United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(including a “balance of harms” element in duress).  Duress, by contrast, contains no 
such “lesser of two evils” element.  Id. at 204 n.3; see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.7(a), at 73-74 (2d ed. 2003) (describing MPC approach, 
which eschews a “balance of harms” element for duress, as the majority approach). 
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loss of his own arm).  Going further, if the defendant cuts off the arms 
of two innocent persons to avoid having his own arm cut off by a 
coercer, the duress defense is still available.  Indeed, if a “lesser of 
evils” analysis were part of the duress defense, it would not be a separate 
defense, but rather merely a subspecies of the necessity defense confined 
to threats by human agents. 
One may well wonder why the law would require a “choice of evils” 
analysis for necessity but omit one for duress.  The American Law 
Institute has explained that where a human coercer makes a defendant 
choose to commit a crime which is an evil equal to or greater than the 
evil with which he himself is threatened, the “basic interests of the law 
may be satisfied by prosecution of the agent of unlawful force” (the 
coercer).  Where a defendant creates an equal or greater harm in 
response to a natural threat, by contrast, “no one is subject to the law’s 
application.”38  Because of this difference regarding a “lesser evil” 
requirement, necessity is considered a “justification” defense, while 
duress is merely an “excuse” defense.39  This is the near-universal view 
of commentators as well.40  “Justification” defenses focus on the criminal 
acts themselves, while “excuse” defenses focus on the defendants who 
commit them.41  If a defendant establishes a justification, it means that 
society does not condemn the act committed; on balance, the justice 
system decides that society is better off that the act occurred.  If a 
defendant establishes an excuse, society still condemns the act, but finds 
a reason why that particular defendant need not be punished—the 
defendant’s insanity, for example.42
The distinction carries with it several important legal consequences.  
The first concerns burdens of proof.  Like most excuse defenses, duress 
is often an affirmative defense on which the defendant bears a burden of 
 38. MPC 1985, supra note 36, § 2.09 cmt. at 379. 
 39. DRESSLER, supra note 35, at 299-300; see also Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the 
Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL L. 
REV. 1331, 1348, 1356 (1989) (criticizing some courts which blur the distinction and 
noting that most states treat duress as an excuse). 
 40. See Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A 
Justification, Not An Excuse—And Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 834-35 
(2003) (stating that “[v]irtually no one argues that modern defenses of duress . . . can be 
rationalized as a defense of justification,” but explaining why some authors take a 
contrary view). 
 41. Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They 
Are, and What They Ought To Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 726 (2004). 
 42. DRESSLER, supra note 35, at 298-302. 




either production or persuasion.  Commentators agree that placing the 
burden on the defendant is more appropriate for an excuse defense.43  In 
contrast, where a justification defense like necessity is raised, there is a 
better argument for a rule requiring prosecutors to bear the burden of 
proving the absence of a necessity.44
Another consequence of the excuse-justification typology concerns 
accomplice liability.  If a principal charged with a crime is acquitted on 
the basis of a justification defense, a defendant alleged to have been an 
accomplice of that principal typically cannot be held liable either.  The 
justification-based acquittal establishes that the principal did not commit 
an act which society condemns; by the same token, the alleged accomplice 
cannot be held liable for assisting him.45  However, an excuse defense 
carries with it no legal benefit to an alleged accomplice.  The principal’s 
justification-based acquittal signifies only that the principal himself will 
not be held liable for his actions, not that the actions themselves are 
immune from condemnation.  Thus, the principal’s accomplice can still 
be found guilty for assisting the principal in committing the act.46
Courts have sometimes confused duress and necessity.47  For 
example, in the Sixth Circuit case of United States v. Singleton,48 the 
defendant had claimed that his illegal gun possession was necessary 
and justified to protect him against a person who had threatened to kill 
him.  Though the court repeatedly referred to a “justification” defense, 
it listed duress-style elements, and neglected to mention the “balance 
of harms” requirement (which was not at issue in that case).49  Later, in 
 43. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review Of The 
Concepts And The Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1167-73 (1987). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262, 265 (1963); United States 
v. Lopez, 662 F. Supp. 1083, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
 46. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commonwealth, 521 S.E.2d 293, 297 (Va. Ct. App. 1999); 
DRESSLER, supra note 35, § 170.05(D), at 218. 
 47. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (noting that common 
law distinguished between the two, but that “[m]odern cases have tended to blur the 
distinction between duress and necessity”); Dressler, supra note 39, at 1348 (criticizing 
courts which blur the distinction between the two and citing cases).  In Bailey, the only 
distinction explicitly noted by the Supreme Court was the common law’s historic 
dichotomy between human threats (duress) and natural threats (necessity).  But the Court 
also cited with approval the MPC provisions on “duress” and “choice of evils,” 
implicitly approving the more significant distinction based on the presence or absence of 
a “balance of harms” requirement.  Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409-10 (citing, inter alia, MPC 
1985, supra note 36, §§ 2.09, 3.02). 
For that matter, courts have often confused the more general concepts of 
“justification” and “excuse.”  See Milhizer, supra note 41, at 726-27 (citing examples of 
courts confusing the two and emphasizing the need for the distinction to be retained). 
 48. United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 49. Id. 
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United States v. Riffe,50 the Sixth Circuit analyzed a true duress defense 
by borrowing the Singleton elements, without noting that Singleton had 
used them for a “justification” (necessity) defense.51  Similarly, the 
Ninth Circuit has used classic duress elements (with no lesser evil 
element) in delineating what it termed a “justification” defense for 
felons claiming that their illegal gun possession was “necessary” to 
protect others.52  One of these Ninth Circuit opinions recently stated 
that the term “justification” could encompass necessity and duress, as 
well as self-defense.53  The court did not seem to draw a distinction 
between the defenses of duress and necessity, although the case did not 
raise that issue.54
C.  The (Absent) “Balance Of Harms” Element 
In the above instances, courts incorrectly used duress-style elements 
for defense claims of necessity, erroneously failing to include the 
“balance of harms” analysis.  Where it made a difference in the outcome, 
this mistake would likely have the effect of assisting defendants by 
relieving them of the burden of showing that their conduct was the lesser 
evil.  But courts have erred in the other direction as well, to the 
detriment of defendants.  In true duress cases, courts have sometimes 
erroneously imposed a requirement that the defendant’s acts constitute a 
lesser evil than disobeying the law55—a requirement appropriate for a 
justification defense like necessity but inappropriate for an excuse 
 50. United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 51. Id. at 569.  Despite the occasional instance of terminological confusion, the 
Sixth Circuit has nonetheless emphasized the need to keep the concepts of necessity and 
duress separate, and to use the corresponding terms correctly.  United States v. 
Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129, 1133 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 52. See United States v. Beasley, 346 F.3d 930, 933 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 
United States v. Wofford, 122 F.3d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 53. Id. at 934-35. 
 54. Id.  At issue in Beasley was merely the question of which party had the burden 
of proof on the defense.  Id. at 933-36. 
 55. See, e.g., United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1991).  
Inexplicably, the Ninth Circuit in LaFleur relied on two previous Ninth Circuit cases 
which explicitly state the correct rule that the “lesser evil” element is not present 
regarding duress, but rather only regarding necessity.  See id.  at 204 n.3 (citing United 
States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 430, 430 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985) and United States v. 
Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1984)). 




defense like duress.  This was the approach taken by the federal district 
court in the Terance Johnson case.56
The ruling in the Terance Johnson case illustrates the importance of 
this point.  If the duress defense contains a balance of harms element, its 
applicability in homicide cases is drastically curtailed.  If someone is 
ordered at gunpoint to kill an innocent third person, such a killing could 
not be excused, no matter how frightening, intense, immediate, or 
painful the coercion, because no innocent person’s life is worth more 
than another’s.  Aside from the rare case where the coercer threatens to 
kill two or more people if a third person is not killed, the lesser evil 
requirement would disqualify the duress defense.  Thus, the mistaken 
importation of a balance of harms element from necessity into duress 
carries with it real consequences. 
The confusion stems in part from a misstatement of the rule in an early 
version of the influential LaFave and Scott treatise, Substantive Criminal 
Law.57  Describing the defense available to someone who commits a 
crime “under pressure of an unlawful threat from another human being,” 
that treatise at one time stated: 
The rationale of the defense is not that the defendant, faced with the unnerving 
threat of harm unless he does an act which violates the literal language of the 
criminal law, somehow loses his mental capacity to commit the crime in 
question.  Nor is it that the defendant has not engaged in a voluntary act.  Rather 
it is that, even though he has done the act the crime requires and has the mental 
state which the crime requires, his conduct which violates the literal language of 
the criminal law is justified because he has thereby avoided a harm of greater 
magnitude.58
A number of courts have cited this language and applied it to duress 
defenses,59 including the trial court in the Terance Johnson case.60  
However, this passage from the treatise was corrected in the most recent 
current version.  In May 2003, seventeen years after the first edition, it 
 56. Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order, supra note 1, at 5 (citing LaFleur, 971 
F.2d at 204-05). 
 57. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 26. 
 58. Id. § 5.3, at 614-15 (footnotes and internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
 59. See LaFleur, 971 F.2d at 204-05; State v. Jeffrey, 50 P.3d 861, 864 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2002); State v. Rouleau, 528 A.2d 343, 347 (Conn. 1987); State v. Aponte, 784 
A.2d 991, 1001 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); State v. Boone, 544 A.2d 217, 222 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 1988); People v. Lemons, 562 N.W.2d 447, 453 (Mich. 1997); Alford v. State, 866 
S.W.2d 619, 624 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Arnold v. Commonwealth, 560 S.E.2d 
915, 918 (Va. Ct. App. 2002); Pancoast v. Commonwealth, 340 S.E.2d 833, 836 (Va. Ct. 
App. 1986).  Interestingly, several Texas appellate courts have recently (and more aptly) 
cited this language as applicable to the defense of necessity.  See Dotson v. State, 146 
S.W.3d 285, 292 (Tex. App. 2004); Aldrich v. State, 53 S.W.3d 460, 467-68 (Tex. App. 
2001); Arnwine v. State, 20 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App. 2000). 
 60. Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order, supra note 1, at 5 (citing LaFleur, 971 
F.2d at 204-05). 
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was substantially updated, revised, and expanded by original author 
Wayne R. LaFave (original co-author Austin Scott had passed away in 
the interim).61  The relevant passage on duress now reads: 
The rationale of the defense is not that the defendant, faced with the unnerving 
threat of harm unless he does an act which violates the literal language of the 
criminal law, somehow loses his mental capacity to commit the crime in 
question.  Nor is it that the defendant has not engaged in a voluntary act.  Rather 
it is that, even though he has done the act the crime requires and has the mental 
state which the crime requires, his conduct which violates the literal language of 
the criminal law is excused because he lacked a fair opportunity to avoid acting 
unlawfully.62
Note that the word “excused” now replaces “justified,” and the 
language concerning the defendant’s lack of a “fair opportunity to avoid 
acting unlawfully” replaces that concerning a “balance of harms” 
analysis.63
The MPC takes the more modern approach, reserving the balance of 
harms element for the justification defense of necessity, and requiring 
for duress only that the defendant suffer threats of such a nature that a 
“person of reasonable firmness” would accede to the coercer’s 
demands.64
The approach is similar in the federal courts.65  Federal circuit cases 
discussing duress elements generally do not list a lesser evil 
 61. LAFAVE, supra note 37, at XI. 
 62. Id. § 9.7(a), at 73 (footnotes and internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
 63. Notwithstanding the incorrect general statement of the underlying rationale for 
the duress defense, even the earlier LaFave and Scott version of the treatise recognized 
that duress could be a defense to felony murder.  See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 26, § 
5.3(b), at 434-35 (noting that duress is a defense to “a killing done by another in the 
commission of some lesser felony participated in by the defendant under duress,” and 
specifically citing the example of a defendant who is coerced into assisting a bank 
robbery in which the coercer kills a bank customer).  Inexplicably, the district court in 
the Terance Johnson case quoted this specific language on felony murder in its opinion, 
while simultaneously relying on the more general “balance of harms” language from the 
same section of the LaFave-Scott treatise to support its conclusion that duress could 
never be a defense for Johnson (a defendant assertedly coerced into a bank robbery 
where the coercer killed a bank customer).  See Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order, 
supra note 1, at 6-8. 
 64. Uniform Laws, MPC, supra note 36, § 2.09(1), at 131.  A majority of the 
modern state criminal codes take the MPC approach here.  LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 
9.7(b), at 81. 
 65. See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 1046 (1991); United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 
1984); O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 24, at 747 (distinguishing duress from justification 




requirement.66  The pattern jury instructions in the various federal 
circuits omit any reference to a balance of harms analysis in describing 
the defense of duress, reserving that element for the defense of 
necessity.67
Most federal circuits do not have a separate pattern jury instruction for 
the distinct defense of necessity,68 but federal cases do recognize the 
defense in most circuits.  Where federal courts explicitly recognize 
necessity as a distinct defense, they usually add the unique element that 
the evil sought to be avoided by the unlawful action is greater than the 
evil of violating the criminal statute at issue.69
III.  DURESS AS A DEFENSE TO HOMICIDE 
A.  The Traditional Rule 
The general common-law rule is that duress cannot be a defense to 
murder.70  Most states follow this common-law rule, either by statute,71 
or through case precedent.72  Federal courts also follow this common-
defenses of self-defense and necessity, and defining the latter as “the forced choice of a 
lesser of two evils”).  But see LaFleur, 971 F.2d at 204-05. 
 66. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 67. O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 24, at 749-72 (listing the pattern jury 
instructions of the various circuits). 
 68. Most circuit pattern jury instructions contain a special instruction for duress 
but nothing regarding necessity or justification.  However, the Eleventh Circuit’s pattern 
instructions contain a special instruction entitled “Duress and Coercion (Justification or 
Necessity),” suggesting that no distinction is recognized.  COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 65 (2003). 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129, 1136 (6th Cir. 1993); 
Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 693. 
 70. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *30 
(William Carey Jones ed. 1916) (“[T]hough a man be violently assaulted, and hath no 
other possible means of escaping death, but by killing an innocent person, this fear and 
force shall not acquit him of murder; for he ought rather to die himself than escape by 
the murder of an innocent.”); Regina v. Howe, [1987] 1 A.C. 417, 424 (H.L.) (Eng.); 40 
AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 115 (2003). 
 71. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-412(C) (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.         
§ 18-1-708 (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-8 
(LexisNexis 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3209 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.              
§ 14:18(6)(1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 103-A (1983); MO. ANN. STAT.      
§ 562.071 (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.270 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.      
§ 9A.16.060 (West 2004); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1999) (disallowing 
duress defense for capital crimes); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-201 (4) (2004) (same); 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-11 (West 1993) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-3-110 
(2005) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 194.010(8) (LexisNexis 2004) (same). 
 72. See, e.g., Pittman v. State, 460 So. 2d 232 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (duress not a 
defense to murder); Brewer v. State, 78 S.W. 773 (Ark. 1904) (same); Luther v. State, 
342 S.E.2d 316 (Ga. 1986) (legislature’s exclusion of murder from crimes to which 
coercion defense applies did not violate equal protection); People v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d 
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law rule.73  It is also the rule in the U.S. military justice system.74  
Internationally, the law divides up among civil law and common-law 
countries: virtually all civil law nations permit duress as a complete 
defense to all crimes, including homicide, while virtually all common-law 
jurisdictions preclude the defense as it relates to the killing of innocent 
persons.75  The United States is unique among common-law nations in that 
some of its states, following the MPC approach, allow duress as a defense 
to murder.76  Of course, even states which reject the defense at the guilt 
phase will recognize duress as a mitigating factor during sentencing.77
However, some states have rejected the common-law rule and have 
allowed duress as a murder defense.78  England, the source of our 
common-law rules regarding duress, has held that while the defense is 
not available for the actual killer, it can be asserted as a defense to 
another defendant who participates in the overall homicide.79
806 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); McCune v. State, 491 N.E.2d 993 (Ind. 1986); Kee v. State, 438 
N.E.2d 993, 994 (Ind. 1982) (defense not available for attempted murder); State v. 
LeCompte, 327 N.W.2d 221 (Iowa 1982) (same, for aiding and abetting murder); State v. 
Chism, 436 So. 2d 464 (La. 1983) (accessory after the fact to murder); State v. Capaci, 
154 So. 419 (La. 1934) (capital offenses); Wentworth v. State, 349 A.2d 421 (Md. 1975); 
People v. Dittis, 403 N.W.2d 94 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (first degree murder); Watson v. 
State, 55 So.2d 441 (Miss. 1951); State v. Perkins, 364 N.W.2d 20 (Mont. 1985) (first 
degree murder); State v. Finnell, 688 P.2d 769 (N.M. 1984) (first degree murder and 
attempted murder); State v. Cheek, 520 S.E.2d 545 (N.C. 1999); Pugliese v. 
Commonwealth, 428 S.E.2d 16 (Va. 1993); State v. Ng, 750 P.2d 632 (Wash. 1988); 
Burnett v. State, 997 P.2d 1023 (Wyo. 2000). 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 206 (9th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Buchanan, 529 F.2d 1148, 1153 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 74. MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL UNITED STATES R.C.M. 916(h) (2000) (stating 
duress “is a defense to any offense except killing an innocent person”). 
 75. Brooks, supra note 22, at 867. 
 76. See id. at 867 n.19. 
 77. See, e.g., State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866 (Ohio 1998).  This approach was not 
available in the Terance Johnson case, because a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) 
(2000) carries a minimum mandatory life sentence. 
 78. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.440 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-231 
(1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West 2005) (defense only available to reduce degree 
of crime to manslaughter); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-302 (2003); Whitus v. State, 116 
S.E.2d 205, 205-06 (Ga. 1960) (defense available by statute where threat is imminent); 
Tully v. State, 730 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (defense available for 
felony murder); Commonwealth v. Berger, 612 A.2d 1037, 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) 
(defense is available for first degree murder under appropriate factual circumstances); 
Paris v. State, 31 S.W.855, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1895) (defense available where person 
making threat is “actually present”). 
 79. See Regina v. Howe, [1987] 1 A.C. 417, 427 (H.L.) (Eng.). 




A middle ground taken by some jurisdictions is to allow duress to 
mitigate murder to manslaughter.  Some states have statutes to this 
effect.80
The exception for murder stems from the policy judgment that a 
defendant cannot value his own life more than an innocent person’s, and 
thus has no right to kill an innocent person just to save his own.81  This 
policy judgment—that a defendant under duress cannot value an innocent 
victim’s life more than his own—certainly smacks of a balance of harms 
analysis.  As noted above, most courts and commentators would restrict a 
balance of harms element to the justification defense of necessity, and not 
apply it to the excuse of duress.  Thus, the common-law exception that 
disallows a duress defense to murder is potentially a contradiction.  Some 
could argue that the exception shows that a balance of harms approach 
should apply to duress as well as necessity.  This is the approach taken by 
the trial court in the Terance Johnson case.82  As a matter of simply 
describing the common law, however, it is best seen as a special case of 
the lesser evil rationale.  The common law took the position as a general 
matter that the duress defense could be available even where the illegal act 
is a greater harm than that threatened to the defendant by the coercer.  But 
the majority view was to draw the line at excusing a coerced defendant 
who actually kills an innocent person.83
B.  The Need for a More Flexible Approach 
Many prominent commentators have criticized this rule on both 
pragmatic and philosophical grounds.84  The pragmatic argument is that 
it is unrealistic to expect such a rule to actually deter people from killing, 
and to give up their lives, when they are truly in a kill-or-be-killed 
situation.  While heroism does occasionally occur, it cannot be legislated. 
The philosophical argument is that the rationale that all innocent lives 
have equal worth demonstrates only that coerced killing of an innocent 
is not justified: the act itself is not, on balance, defensible from a moral 
or societal perspective.  This rationale, however, does not bar the 
 80. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (2001); MINN. STAT. ANN.                   
§ 609.20(3) (West 2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1) (West 2005); see also Gerald A. 
Williams, Note, Tully v. State of Oklahoma: Oklahoma Recognizes Duress as a Defense 
For Felony-Murder, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 515, 526-27 (1988) (noting the advantages of this 
approach). 
 81. BLACKSTONE, supra note 70; Epps, supra note 22, at 989. 
 82. Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order, supra note 1, at 5. 
 83. See Regina v. Howe, [1987] 1 A.C. 417, 439 (duress defense exception for 
homicide relies upon “the special sanctity that the law attaches to human life”). 
 84. See, e.g., Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 
616 (1949); Dressler, supra note 39, at 1371-74. 
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conclusion that the person committing the admittedly unjustifiable act 
should be excused.85  If a legally insane person’s disability causes him to 
kill an innocent person without cause or provocation, the law excuses the 
defendant even though it does not condone the act.  There is no reason 
duress could not be handled similarly. 
There is good reason for skepticism with respect to the traditional 
common-law rule.  From a utilitarian perspective, it seems unlikely that 
the rule does any real good.  No evidence exists to suggest that the rule 
barring the duress defense to homicide actually deters persons from 
killing when they are truly in peril of their lives and no reasonable 
alternative exists (as is required by the classic elements of duress).  Of 
course, true duress-murder situations seem to be relatively rare,86 and 
prosecutions of same rarer still, making an empirical study of such cases 
difficult.  But common sense does suggest real doubt as to the deterrent 
effect of this rule.  Where a coerced defendant sincerely believes that he 
must kill an innocent third party or else be killed, it seems that the last 
thing on the defendant’s mind would be speculation on whether he 
would face prosecution if he survived the experience. 
The rule also seems overly harsh.  Affording an excuse defense to at 
least some persons in this situation does not convey the message that 
society condones the killing of innocent third parties.  Instead, it merely 
signifies that individuals under extreme coercion, like defendants who 
are insane, involuntarily intoxicated, or extremely young, are not 
considered to be deserving of punishment, even when the acts they 
commit are worthy of condemnation.  While it may be true in many 
situations that a person threatened with death ought to have the fortitude 
to resist killing an innocent third party, can it really be that there are 
never any situations in which the defendant’s eventual submission to the 
threats is understandable enough to allow an excuse under the law?  Put 
another way: Isn’t the level of punishment deserved by a defendant in 
this situation dependent upon the facts?  If so, then ought not such a 
fact-sensitive question be committed to the sound discretion of a jury? 
The current common-law rule, with its blanket condemnation of all 
persons who succumb to legitimate duress, is woefully unrealistic about 
 85. Dressler, supra note 39, at 1373-74. 
 86. Brooks, supra note 22, at 868-69. 




human nature.  It not only “asks us to be virtuous,” but actually “demands 
our virtual sainthood.”87
This is not to say that society ought to condone the taking of an 
innocent life wherever the killer has a reasonable self-preservation 
argument.  The essence of an excuse defense is that society condemns 
the act but declines to punish the actor as a criminal.  If the law were to 
recognize a jury question on the issue of whether duress could excuse a 
homicide, lesser remedies would still be available for society to express 
its condemnation.  These remedies could range anywhere from criminal 
liability for a lesser offense (for example, a recklessness or negligence 
based offense), to civil tort liability, to the informal, nonlegal 
punishment which comes from a damaged reputation and lessened social 
standing. 
Nor would the excuse be granted lightly under our current criminal justice 
system.  Using the classic elements of the defense, a judge or jury would 
have to find that there was a real and imminent threat, a well-founded fear 
that the threat would be carried out, and no reasonable opportunity to avoid 
committing the crime under the circumstances.  Further, most courts would 
also require that the defendant was not reckless in placing himself in the 
situation giving rise to the coercion.  Commentators agree that juries are 
suitably skeptical about claims of duress, and are not predisposed toward 
relieving killers or their accomplices of criminal liability absent compelling 
circumstances.88  Allowing a duress argument to go to the jury in homicide 
cases will not cause blameworthy defendants to escape punishment, because 
juries will still require that the evidence support a finding of genuine and 
unavoidable coercion. 
Indeed, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system itself argues for 
reform of the all-or-nothing common-law rule.  The MPC rule would 
allow an excuse wherever the circumstances were such that “a person of 
reasonable firmness in [the actor’s] situation would have been unable to 
resist.”89  Adhering to the traditional common-law rule requires condemning 
at least some defendants despite the fact that a reasonable person in that 
defendant’s position would not have been able to resist.  It seems 
awkward, to say the least, for a judge or juror to condemn an accused for 
 87. Dressler, supra note 39, at 1373; see also MPC 1985, supra note 36, § 2.09 
cmt. at 375:  
Where it would be both “personally and socially debilitating” to accept the 
actor’s cowardice as a defense, it would be equally debilitating to demand that 
heroism be the standard of legality. The proper treatment of the hero is not 
merely to withhold a social censure; it is to give him praise and just reward. 
 88. See, e.g., Alan Reed, Duress and Provocation as Excuses to Murder: Salutary 
Lessons from Recent Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 51, 63 
(1996); Dressler, supra note 39, at 1373-74. 
 89. Uniform Laws, MPC, supra note 36, § 2.09(1), at 131. 
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acting in a way that the judge or juror himself would have acted under 
the same circumstances.  Requiring judges or jurors to do this undermines 
the credibility of our criminal justice system.  As the American Law 
Institute put it: 
[L]aw is ineffective in the deepest sense, indeed . . . it is hypocritical, if it 
imposes on the actor who has the misfortune to confront a dilemmatic choice, a 
standard that his judges are not prepared to affirm that they should and could 
comply with if their turn to face the problem should arise.  Condemnation in 
such a case is bound to be an ineffective threat; what is, however, more 
significant is that it is divorced from any moral base and is unjust.90
Consistent with these weaknesses in its practical and philosophic 
underpinnings, the current rule can lead to unjust and inconsistent 
results.  A duress defense may relieve a coerced defendant of aggravated 
assault liability even where the defendant deliberately caused grievous 
bodily harm, but would not be available to a second coerced defendant 
who reluctantly participated in a felony and took great care to prevent 
harming anyone (if another participant killed someone).  Perversely, the 
first defendant, the one with the greater mens rea and more blameworthy 
conduct, goes free, while the other is guilty of murder—in most states, 
capital murder.  The second defendant is less in need of deterrence, 
rehabilitation, or incapacitation, and is less deserving of retribution, yet 
is the only one who is convicted and punished.  Moreover, the difference 
in treatment is attributable to the acts of a third party over whom the 
defendant has no control.91
To take another example: with the exact same conduct, circumstances, 
and mens rea, two defendants under duress may each intentionally cause 
grievous bodily harm to two different victims.  If the first victim 
recovers, that defendant would have a complete defense.  If the second 
victim dies after a six-month struggle, the second defendant would be 
guilty of murder.  Liability goes from zero to the maximum, all depending 
on the vagaries of the victim’s physiological powers of recovery.  This 
should not be the result.  The law should not be a crap shoot. 
Of course, in certain cases the criminal law does allow liability to turn 
on the results caused, as distinct from merely examining the conduct and 
 90. MPC 1985, supra note 36, § 2.09 cmt. at 374-75. 
 91. It is true that a third party’s actions may normally affect a defendant’s liability 
when that defendant is an accomplice.  However, an accomplice acts with the specific 
intent that the third party (the principal) carry out the crime in question, and performs 
acts of his own free will designed to assist the principal in carrying out that crime.  None 
of this is true of the coerced defendant. 




mens rea of the accused.  For example, consider two equally drunk and 
irresponsible defendants who get behind the wheel and drive in exactly 
the same reckless manner, causing identical automobile accidents, with 
one accident causing serious injury to the victim and the other killing the 
victim.  The second defendant, but not the first, could be convicted of 
negligent homicide. 
However, the first defendant would still be liable for driving while 
intoxicated, reckless endangerment, and, possibly, some form of assault.  
The difference in medical result changes the punishment as a matter of 
degree only.  But in the duress example above, the difference in outcome 
is more than a matter of degree.  The defendant unlucky enough to have 
been coerced into beating the “thin-skulled victim” risks capital liability, 
while the defendant lucky enough to have been coerced into attacking 
the more resilient “thick-skulled victim” has no criminal liability 
whatever.  Such stark differences between the results in these two cases 
are arbitrary.  They do not further the legitimate goals of any rational 
criminal justice scheme. 
Perhaps what lies beneath the rule’s seeming harshness is skepticism 
about the impossibility of desistance.  Courts may believe that instances 
in which a defendant has no reasonable alternative to killing an innocent 
third party are truly rare; most of the time, there is a potential way out 
which the defendant should have explored.  A bright-line rule could 
better encourage persons placed under duress to resist unlawful pressure 
and find that way out.  This brings two responses to mind.  First, whether a 
defendant has a reasonable alternative to killing an innocent third party 
is precisely the kind of fact-intensive judgment that should be made by a 
jury, which is not likely to be overly receptive to excusing the murder of 
an innocent person.  Second, there must be a minority of cases, however 
small, in which desistance truly is impossible; in those cases, the 
absolute bar of the duress defense remains unjust. 
The most dramatic example of this comes from the International 
Hague Tribunal.92  In Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,93 a Serb soldier in the 
former Yugoslavia was ordered along with other soldiers to massacre 
Muslim civilians.  Alone among the soldiers, he protested the order and 
attempted to disobey.  His commanding officer informed him that he 
could obey the order or be executed himself; either way, the Muslim 
 92. The Hague Tribunal is an international court convened to adjudicate cases 
stemming from the conflict within the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.  Its full title 
is “The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia Since 1991.”  Brooks, supra note 22, at 862 n.1. 
 93. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment (Oct. 7, 1997), 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-aj971007e.htm. 
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civilians would die.94  Erdemovic reluctantly obeyed the order, attempting 
to shoot in such a way as to minimize the damage done, but inevitably 
ended up killing multiple civilians.95  He later confessed his story to a 
journalist, expressed remorse, and provided crucial testimony to 
corroborate the existence of the secret massacre.96  The prosecution 
conceded that Erdemovic would probably have died had he disobeyed 
the order, and that his disobedience would probably not have saved the 
civilians.97  Nonetheless, the court followed the common-law rule barring 
duress as a defense to murder, holding that his duress could mitigate his 
sentence only.98  Erdemovic received a ten-year sentence.99
Quoting Blackstone, the plurality opinion relied on the moral principle 
behind the traditional common law that a man under duress “ought 
rather to die himself, than escape by the murder of an innocent.”100  It 
also emphasized the unique importance in international war crime trials 
of encouraging humane conduct.101  The court was unmoved by the 
utilitarian argument that the innocent victims would have died anyway 
regardless of whether the defendant had relented.  As the plurality 
opinion put it, the rule “does not depend on what the reasonable person 
is expected to do”; rather, it depends on “an absolute moral postulate 
which is clear and unmistakable for the implementation of international 
humanitarian law.”102
While a moral bright line may indeed have value in this area, I believe 
that value is outweighed by the futility, and unfairness to defendants, of 
holding defendants to unrealistically, unreasonably high standards which 
few judges or jurors could maintain.  In addition, this “absolute moral 
 94. Brooks, supra note 22, at 863-65. 
 95. Id. at 865. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 867. 
 98. Id. at 867-68. 
 99. Id. at 866.  He ultimately served only five years.  Id. at 886. 
 100. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of 
Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ¶ 71 (Oct. 7, 1997), available at http://www. 
un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-asojmcd971007e.htm, (quoting 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *28 (London, W. Clowes 
and Sons 1857)), cited in Brooks, supra note 22, at 876-79. 
 101. Id. ¶ 75 (stating that the war crimes tribunal must “facilitate the development 
and effectiveness of international humanitarian law and to promote its aims and 
application by [recognizing] the normative effect which criminal law should have upon 
those subject to them”). 
 102. See Brooks, supra note 22, at 879 (quoting from the opinion). 




postulate” is not maintained in the American common-law tradition 
regarding a highly analogous situation, as set out below. 
C.  The Analogous Rule Regarding Necessity 
The common law had an analogous exception barring the use of the 
necessity defense on a charge of homicide.  It too has received a fair 
amount of (deserved) criticism, and does not appear to command 
majority support among modern American jurisdictions.103
The classic case is Dudley and Stephens,104 a nineteenth-century 
English case.  In Dudley, a shipwreck forced the defendants and the 
victim onto a life raft far out at sea for weeks with severely limited 
supplies.  Facing starvation, the defendants killed a sickly cabin boy and 
ate him.105  The jury found that the killing may have been the defendants’ 
only hope for survival, but the trial judge ruled that the killing was 
murder.106  The Queen’s Bench upheld the defendants’ murder conviction, 
stating flatly that the taking of an innocent life could never be justified 
by the necessity of saving another life or even several other lives.107  The 
defendants were sentenced to death, but were paroled by executive 
clemency after serving six months in jail.108
This decision has been roundly criticized.109  An analogous American 
shipwreck case, almost as famous as Dudley, reached a different 
conclusion on the law.  In United States v. Holmes,110 the defendant 
threw several lifeboat passengers overboard to their deaths in order to 
save a greater number of lifeboat passengers from being drowned in a 
storm.  The court ruled that such an intentional sacrifice of human life 
could have been justifiable if it had been done by drawing lots.111  This 
appears to be the modern American approach.112  The MPC allows the 
necessity defense to be applied to a homicide charge as long as more 
people were saved than killed.113
 103. LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 10.1(c), at 124 n.41. 
 104. Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273. 
 105. Id. at 273-74. 
 106. Id. at 277. 
 107. Id. at 288. 
 108. Milhizer, supra note 41, at 795 nn.391-92. 
 109. Id. at 794-95, 890-91 (describing general consensus that the decision was 
result-oriented). 
 110. United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383). 
 111. Id. at 367.  The defendant’s conviction in that case was based in part on his 
failure to cast lots, as well as his failure to rank civilian passengers ahead of the crew.  
Id. 
 112. LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 10.1(c), at 123-24, 124 n.41. 
 113. See MPC 1985, supra note 36, § 3.02 cmt. at 14-15. 
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Of course, the fact that the necessity defense may be asserted against a 
homicide charge does not necessarily argue that the duress defense also 
be allowed against homicide.  The necessity defense—at least, where it 
is properly defined—applies only to situations in which the harm 
avoided is greater than the harm committed.  In the case of homicide, 
that means, as the MPC requires, that the necessity defense could only 
be asserted where the defendant saved more lives than he killed.  
Because the duress defense has no such requirement (again, at least 
where it is properly defined), one could justify a homicide rule allowing 
a defense of necessity but not duress.  At a minimum, however, the two 
are analogous as areas of the law where the traditional common-law rule 
rigidly allowed nothing less than heroic self-sacrifice, and where that 
rule has since been widely criticized as too rigid. 
D.  Using Duress to Mitigate to Manslaughter 
Allowing duress to reduce a charge from murder to manslaughter is an 
improvement over the traditional rule, but is still overly harsh.  A 
number of states take this approach.114 The theory behind such an 
approach is an analogy to “diminished capacity.”115  Diminished 
capacity is an imperfect form of the insanity defense: The doctrine 
allows defendants to introduce evidence that, while they may have not 
met the legal definition of insanity at the time of the offense, they were 
nonetheless suffering emotional or mental distress or impairment so 
severe that they could not have had the requisite mens rea to commit the 
crime, or were otherwise deserving of leniency.116  The doctrine is 
recognized in many states, but not all.117  As applied to homicide, it 
often allows a defendant to defend successfully against a charge of 
murder, with the result that the defendant is convicted of the lesser-
included offense of manslaughter.118
While the doctrine can be viewed narrowly as applying only where the 
severe distress or impairment actually negates the requisite mens rea for 
the crime in question, it can also be viewed more broadly.  Specifically, 
the doctrine can be seen simply as creating a mitigating factor 
 114. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(4) (2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
609.20(3) (West 2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1) (West 2005). 
 115. Williams, supra note 80, at 526-27. 
 116. See LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 9.2, at 12-13 (citing cases). 
 117. Id. at 13.  Indeed, the doctrine is approved in a minority of states.  Id. at 13 n.3. 
 118. Id. at 13. 




warranting a reduction from the charged offense to a lesser-included 
offense, regardless of whether the “diminished capacity” actually 
prevented the defendant from forming the requisite criminal intent in his 
mind.119
For example, the MPC defines “murder” as a killing done either 
“purposely,” “knowingly,” or “recklessly under circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life.”120  These are the three 
mental states sufficient for murder liability.  But the MPC allows murder 
to be reduced to manslaughter wherever the killing is committed “under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there 
is reasonable explanation or excuse.”121  This provision combines both 
the notions of “heat of passion” killings and “diminished capacity.”122  It 
is followed in several states.123  Notably, the MPC provision does not 
require that the “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” in fact vitiate 
the actors’ purpose, knowledge, or “extreme indifference” to human life; 
it simply states that such disturbance mitigates the crime to manslaughter.  
By analogy, some jurisdictions allow a jury to decide that the emotional 
and mental pressure suffered by a coerced defendant, while not enough 
to excuse the killing entirely, ought to at least mitigate the crime from 
murder to manslaughter.124
The theoretical argument against this approach is that a defendant’s 
passion is not a reason to absolve him from liability for murder (as 
opposed to the lesser crime of manslaughter) unless that passion is 
provoked by the victim, as is the case in a traditional heat of passion 
killing.  As originally stated by the Rhode Island Supreme Court a century 
ago: 
One’s own passion is not a defense to reduce a crime unless it is caused by 
provocation, like a fight or a gross indignity, between the victim and the 
assailant.  Passion induced by a third person would be no defense to a homicide.  
So fear induced by one person is no defense to a defendant who kills another 
under its influence.125
Some modern courts have raised similar objections.126
Given the unfairness involved in denying a duress defense to homicide 
generally, allowing mitigation to murder is a step in the right direction.  
 119. See DRESSLER, supra note 35, § 26.01, at 361-62. 
 120. Uniform Laws, MPC, supra note 36, § 210.2(1), at 305. 
 121. Id. § 210.3(1)(b), at 356. 
 122. DRESSLER, supra note 35, § 26.03, at 368-69. 
 123. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(1) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(2) 
(West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205.5(1) (2003). 
 124. See generally supra note 80 (listing state statutes which take this approach). 
 125. State v. Nargashian, 58 A. 953, 955 (R.I. 1904) (emphasis added). 
 126. Williams, supra note 80, at 527, 527 n.92 (citing Wright v. State, 402 So. 2d 
493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) and People v. Gleckler, 411 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. 1980)). 
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However, most of the objections to the general common-law rule barring 
any use of the defense against homicide still apply to this rule.  
Providing for manslaughter convictions is unlikely to actually deter the 
criminal conduct in question.  The rule still requires an unrealistic level 
of heroism from persons undergoing true coercion, and still requires 
judges and jurors to hold defendants to a standard most of them could 
not manifest were they faced with the same pressures.  And it still leads 
to arbitrary differences in outcome, such as those between a defendant 
who intentionally causes grievous bodily injury under duress (complete 
defense), one who kills under duress despite taking precautions to avoid 
harm (murder conviction), and those between two coerced defendants 
with identical conduct and mens rea but with differing results (mere 
injury versus death). 
IV.  THE SPECIAL CASE OF FELONY MURDER 
A.  General 
Regardless of the soundness of the rationale for excluding a duress 
defense from murder cases, the rationale does not apply to felony 
murder.127  Where the defendant merely assists in the underlying felony 
during which a co-defendant kills the victim, without actually directly 
harming the victim, the defendant does not choose to take an innocent 
life to save his own.  What about such cases where the defendant plays 
no role in the actual killing, but is merely present at the underlying 
 127. A felony murder charge requires no showing of any mens rea at all with 
respect to the killing itself.  It is enough merely for the prosecutor to prove that the 
defendant took part in the underlying felony (directly or as an accomplice), and that the 
victim died as the result of the felony.  See, e.g., People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 719 
(Cal. 1983); State v. Cooke, 874 A.2d 805, 811 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).  Even if it was 
another participant in the felony who actually killed the victim, the defendant is still 
guilty of felony murder by virtue of his participation in the predicate felony.  See, e.g., 
id.; Chamberlain v. State, 881 So. 2d 1087, 1104-05 (Fla. 2004); People v. Morgan, 364 
N.E.2d 56, 59-60 (Ill. 1977); People v. Bustos, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112, 115 (Ct. App. 
1994); People v. Carines, 597 N.W.2d 130, 136-37 (Mich. 1999).  In such situations, 
using a felony murder charge instead of or in addition to another homicide charge gives 
the prosecutor the ability to secure a conviction without having to persuade the jury that 
the defendant caused the death purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. 
While a felony murder charge can be used even in situations where the defendant 
personally killed the victim, and did so with some level of mens rea, references to felony 
murder in this section refer (unless otherwise stated) to situations where someone besides 
the defendant unexpectedly kills the victim. 




felony due to the coercion of another?128  Ought not the duress defense 
apply in at least those instances as an answer to a homicide charge? 
This is an issue of first impression in the federal criminal justice 
system.  Aside from the district court decision in the Terance Johnson 
case, no court has squarely held one way or the other on the question of 
whether duress is available as a defense to felony murder.129  As noted 
above,130 the Sixth Circuit opinion in that case did not address the issue. 
As the leading LaFave treatise on criminal law indicates, the normal 
restriction on the availability of duress for intentional murder does not 
apply to felony murder: 
As stated above, duress is no defense to the intentional taking of a life by the 
threatened person; but it is a defense to a killing done by another in the 
commission of some lesser felony participated in by the defendant under duress.  
Thus, if A compels B at gunpoint to drive him to the bank which A intends to 
rob, and during the ensuing robbery A kills a bank customer C, B is not guilty of 
the robbery (for he was excused by duress) and so is not guilty of felony murder 
of C in the commission of robbery.  The law properly recognizes that one may 
aid in a robbery if he is forced by threats to do so to save his life; he should not 
lose the defense because his threateners unexpectedly kill someone in the course 
of the robbery and thus convert a mere robbery into a murder.131
Other commentators share this view.132
 128. Where the coerced defendant is directly involved in the killing of the victim, 
and duress is held not to be a defense to ordinary homicide, I would argue that the result 
should turn on the mens rea (if any) with which the defendant killed the victim.  If the 
coerced defendant killed the victim purposely or knowingly, the law would hold the 
defendant liable not only for felony murder, but also directly liable on a regular murder 
charge, because the defendant chose to kill.  But where the defendant directly killed the 
victim unintentionally, the coerced defendant’s liability should correspond with his level 
of fault.  Thus, if he was reckless with regard to the chance that his actions would kill the 
victim (for example, he fired warning shots into a crowded bank while under duress by 
bank robbers), he should be liable for reckless homicide, or its equivalent in the 
jurisdiction in question.  If he was merely negligent with regard to the chance that his 
acts would be fatal (for example, he drove a getaway car at an excessive speed while 
under duress, running over a pedestrian), he should be convicted of negligent homicide 
or its equivalent.  If he was without fault in causing the death, his duress should be a 
complete defense to the charge of felony murder.  See infra Part IV.C. (proposing a 
similar approach matching liability to mens rea in an analogous context). 
 129. But see Hall v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 1541, 1546 n.4 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting briefly 
in dicta that the rationale “that one should sacrifice one’s own life before killing or 
helping to kill an innocent victim, is inapplicable in the felony murder context”). 
 130. See supra pp. 161-62. 
 131. LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 9.7(b), at 494-95 (emphasis added).  A sufficient 
amount of coercion can give the accused the defense of duress “unless that crime 
consists of intentionally killing an innocent third person”  Id. at 491 (emphasis added).  
Under Professor LaFave’s formulation quoted here, the result may change if the killing is 
not “unexpected.”  See infra Part IV.B. 
 132. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 952 (2d ed. 1969); Williams, supra 
note 80, at 528-29. 
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Few states have addressed this issue.  Courts in three states have held 
that duress is not a defense to felony murder.133  In two of these states 
(Missouri and Washington), the court avoided detailed analysis of the 
issue because of a statute which stated generally and without elaboration 
that the duress defense was not available to “murder.”134  Because the 
courts viewed the language as unambiguous, they declined to engraft an 
exception onto the statute for felony murder.135  In the third state (Ohio), 
the court ruled that duress was no defense to a felony murder charge, but 
would bar conviction for capital murder.136
However, a slightly greater number of states have held that duress can 
be a defense to felony murder where the defendant is compelled to 
commit a felony in which a death occurs, and duress would be a defense 
to the underlying felony.137 Courts in these six states usually reason 
syllogistically that since the duress would be a defense to the underlying 
felony, and liability on the underlying felony is a prerequisite to felony 
murder liability, duress must be a defense to felony murder.138  Several 
also quote the old LaFave and Scott treatise, which directly addresses 
this point.139  One Kansas state court noted that the common law’s 
rationale for the homicide exception to duress—that one should not be 
able to choose to sacrifice the life of an innocent third party to save 
 133. See State v. Rumble, 690 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Mo. 1984); State v. Woods, 357 
N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (Ohio 1976); State v. Moretti, 120 P. 102, 103-04 (Wash. 1912).  The 
older decisions in Woods and Moretti have been recently reaffirmed.  See State v. Getsy, 
702 N.E.2d 866, 884 (Ohio 1998) (citing Woods, 357 N.E.2d at 1065); State v. Ng, 750 
P.2d 632, 636 (Wash. 1998) (citing Moretti, 120 P. at 102). 
 134. See Rumble, 680 S.W.2d at 942 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 562.071.2 (1978), 
which states that the duress defense “is not available . . . as to the crime of murder”); 
Moretti, 120 P. at 103-04 (citing REM. & BAL. CODE § 2256, which states that the duress 
defense applies “[w]henever any crime, except murder, is committed”).
 135. See Rumble, 680 S.W.2d at 942; Moretti, 120 P. at 104. 
 136. Woods, 357 N.E.2d at 1065 (noting duress would be a defense to the capital 
offense of “aggravated murder”). 
 137. See People v. Anderson, 50 P.3d 368, 379 (Cal. 2002); People v. Serrano, 676 
N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); State v. Hunter, 740 P.2d 559, 568-69 (Kan. 
1987); People v. Merhige, 180 N.W. 418, 422 (Mich. 1920); People v. Pantano, 146 N.E. 
646, 647 (N.Y. 1925); Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 428 S.E.2d 16, 26 (Va. Ct. App. 
1993). 
 138. See Anderson, 50 P.3d at 379; Serrano, 676 N.E.2d at 1015; Pugliese, 428 
S.E.2d at 26. 
 139. See Serrano, 676 N.E.2d at 1015 (attributing the language to Hunter); Hunter, 
740 P.2d at 568-69, (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON 
CRIMINAL LAW § 49, at 377 (1972)); Pugliese, 428 S.E.2d at 26 (same). 




one’s own—simply did not apply to felony murder charges where the 
defendant did not personally kill the victim.140
People v. Merhige is a good example.  Not only is it the first 
American opinion to address the issue, but it also has facts remarkably 
similar both to the Terance Johnson case and the hypothetical used by 
the LaFave treatise.  In Merhige, three armed men robbed a bank, and 
the defendant claimed he had been coerced at gunpoint by the others to 
participate in the bank robbery.  A bank customer was killed by one of 
the bank robbers who had allegedly coerced him.  The Michigan 
Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to assert a duress 
defense because duress could affect his criminal responsibility for the 
underlying felony.141
B.  Policy Considerations 
Superficially, at least, this more lenient approach has some compelling 
commonsense appeal.  If Coercer compels at gunpoint a hapless 
Defendant into assisting Coercer with a bank robbery, and no one is 
killed, the Defendant has a complete defense to the bank robbery. 
Should the result change if Coercer kills a teller without any direct 
participation by Defendant?  If Defendant would have a complete 
defense to the underlying bank robbery, does it make sense to hold the 
defendant liable for a killing committed during that bank robbery by a 
third party over whom Defendant had no control? 
Again, some paradoxical results occur if a duress defense were barred 
in this situation.  A defendant forced at gunpoint to commit any predicate 
offense which would qualify for felony murder would be guilty of 
murder if the coercer unexpectedly killed an innocent third party, even if 
the defendant faced a real and imminent threat that he would be killed, 
and even if the defendant took elaborate pains to ensure that no one 
would be harmed.  At the same time, a duress defense would completely 
relieve a coerced defendant of aggravated assault liability who 
deliberately and methodically beat an innocent victim within, as the 
saying goes, an inch of the victim’s life.  
Further, the more restrictive approach presents potential jury confusion 
where the jury is submitted both the underlying felony count and the 
felony murder count.  Consider the thought process of the jurors as they 
follow the court’s instructions.  If the jury found the elements of duress 
present, they would be instructed to acquit on the underlying felony 
count.  They would then be instructed to convict on the felony murder 
 140. Hunter, 740 P.2d at 568-69. 
 141. Merhige, 180 N.W.2d at 422. 
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count if they found that a killing occurred in furtherance of the 
underlying felony (of which they have just acquitted the defendant).  The 
potential for jury confusion is great. 
As noted above, allowing a duress defense to felony murder charges 
would not “open the floodgates” to killers evading responsibility through 
flimsy claims of duress.  If it is proven that a defendant participated in a 
felony leading to a death, jurors are not overly receptive to arguments 
for escaping responsibility for that death.142
C.  A Middle Ground Approach? 
A number of middle-ground options exist as well.  For example, the 
law could allow the accused to assert a duress defense only if the 
defendant did not know that someone was likely to be killed or, 
alternatively, only if the defendant did not have reason to believe that 
someone was likely to be killed.143  The Sixth Circuit considered this 
approach at oral argument in the Terance Johnson case.  It is consistent 
with some of the writings of commentators who have distinguished 
felony murder from intentional murder with regard to the duress 
defense.144  The opinions I have found recognizing duress defenses to 
felony murder charges have either expressly indicated that the killings 
were unexpected by the defendant, or have been silent on the subject.145
 142. See Dressler, supra note 39, at 1373-74; Reed, supra note 88, at 63. 
 143. If the defendant actually acted with the purpose or knowledge that the victim 
would be killed, he could be charged with murder, separate and apart from any felony 
murder charge.  This is so even if it was someone else who actually “pulled the trigger”; 
the defendant would be liable for his part in the killing under an accomplice liability 
theory. 
 144. For example, the LaFave criminal law treatise states that a coerced robber 
should not lose the duress defense “because his threateners unexpectedly kill someone in 
the course of the robbery.”  LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 9.7(b), at 76 (emphasis added).  
This passage has been cited by a number of courts ruling that a duress defense can apply 
to felony murder.  See, e.g., Serrano, 67 N.E.2d at 1015; Hunter, 740 P.2d at 642.  But 
the same section of the LaFave treatise also states the rule in ways which allow a duress 
defense without any explicit requirement that the killing be unexpected.  The treatise 
claims duress is a defense to “a killing done by another in the commission of some lesser 
felony participated in by the defendant under duress.”  LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 9.7(b), 
at 76.  Further, it states that the defendant under duress has a defense “unless the crime 
consists of intentionally killing an innocent third person.”  Id. at 72.  It does not appear 
that Professor LaFave specifically addressed the intermediate situation where the killing 
was not unexpected, but the defendant did not actually intend to kill. 
 145. See, e.g., Serrano, 676 N.E.2d at 1015 (coercer committed murder 
“unexpectedly”); Hunter, 740 P.2d at 642 (citing LaFave and Scott’s discussion of 
killing occurring “unexpectedly”); Merhige, 180 N.W. at 419-20 (bank robbers were 




This intermediate approach on the use of duress as a defense to felony 
murder would be an improvement on the current rule, but does not go far 
enough.  For the same reason that a duress defense ought to be available 
to a defendant who knowingly kills a third party, it ought to be available 
to someone who participates in an underlying felony expecting that 
someone will likely get killed.  Even assuming a regime in which duress 
is barred as a defense to direct, knowing killings, this intermediate rule 
still goes too far.  A defendant who intentionally participates in a 
predicate felony while expecting that someone likely will be killed has a 
mens rea of intent only regarding the felony itself.  Regarding the 
killing, he has a mens rea of negligence, or, perhaps, recklessness.  At 
most, such a defendant ought to be liable for negligent or reckless 
homicide, and not felony murder—which in most jurisdictions is first 
degree murder, and in death penalty jurisdictions is almost always  
capital murder. 
It is true that such a rule would eliminate the harshness of treating as a 
murderer those who honestly had no expectation that someone would be 
killed.  But it still exhibits almost all the flaws of the more general rule 
barring duress as a defense to felony murder.  Liability of the defendant 
still turns on the actions of a third party over whom the defendant has no 
control.  The defendant is still liable for felony murder, but relieved of 
liability for the prerequisite predicate felony.  Jurors would be confused 
by instructions which, if they find the duress elements met, require them 
to convict for felony murder based on the defendant’s commission of the 
underlying felony, for which they have just acquitted him. 
If the duress defense were indeed limited to felony murder situations 
in which the defendant did not expect that someone would get killed, a 
jury would have to decide the factual question of whether the defendant 
expected that a death would result.  The jury would have to be instructed 
regarding this factual question.  In essence, so limiting the application of 
the duress defense would add an additional element to the duress defense 
in the special case of a felony murder prosecution. 
The instructions would have to address the tricky issues arising in 
defining the standard to be used.  Would the jury have to determine 
whether the defendant thought that a killing was “substantially likely,” 
or “more likely than not,” or merely that there was a “reasonable 
probability” of a killing?  Or would a better formulation be to borrow 
from the standard definition of “recklessness” that the defendant 
“consciously disregarded” a “substantial and unjustified risk” that 
strangers to coerced defendant cab driver, who knew no details of what robbers planned); 
People v. Pantano, 146 N.E. 646, 647 (N.Y. 1925) (defendant “had no connection with” 
the murder, and merely provided useful information to bank robbers while under duress). 
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death would result?146  Perhaps the above subjective formulations 
should be eschewed in favor of an objective standard, like whether the 
defendant “knew or should reasonably have known” that a death was 
likely to result?  Of course, such fine tuning would add to the jury’s 
burden of deciding whether the defendant had a “well-founded fear” of 
death or serious bodily injury, and reasonably believed that there was 
no lawful alternative.  But that extra fine tuning would be necessary if 
this middle-ground approach were to be adopted. 
V.  THE RELEVANCE OF DEFENDANT’S MENTAL INFIRMITY 
Another issue arising in duress situations is the standard by which the 
judge or jury assesses whether the defendant was under sufficient threat, 
as well as whether the defendant had no viable way of safely avoiding 
the criminal acts.  Is a defendant’s sincere but mistaken belief that he 
was in imminent danger sufficient?  What about a sincere but mistaken 
belief that there was no opportunity to avoid the danger while still 
complying with the law?  The answer depends on whether the mistaken 
belief was reasonable. 
The Sixth Circuit did not address this question in its opinion in the 
Terance Johnson case.  The district court in that case held that such a 
sincere but mistaken belief was insufficient as a matter of law to support 
a duress defense, because the duress defense entails an objective rather 
than a subjective standard.147  Moreover, it seemed to hold that the 
defendant must make a prima facie case that he was faced with an actual 
threat, and that there was actually no opportunity to avoid the danger 
while still complying with the law.  That is, the district court held that 
even a reasonable mistaken apprehension of imminent danger, or a 
reasonable mistaken perception that there was no safe alternative to 
obeying the coercer’s illegal commands, would be insufficient to support 
the defense.148  In so ruling, the court correctly held that duress involves 
 146. See, e.g., MPC 1985, supra note 36, § 2.02(2)(c), at 226. 
 147. Terance Johnson Evidentiary Order, supra note 1, at 12-14. 
 148. See id. at 13 (the element of immediate threat “does not require that the 
defendant perceive the threat as immediate, but that the threat actually be immediate”).  
Further, the court stated “the defendant must show that was in a situation in which he 
had no opportunity to avoid the danger, not that he believed himself to be unable to 
avoid the danger.”  Id.  The court also called into question that part of the Sixth Circuit 
Pattern Jury Instruction which required the government to prove “that it was not 
reasonable for the defendant to think that committing the crime would avoid the 
threatened harm.”  Id. 




an objective standard, but took the definition of “objective” too far.  
While an unreasonable mistaken perception of danger would not suffice 
for the defense, a reasonable mistaken perception of danger would. 
A.  Objective Versus Subjective Standard for Duress 
Some authority does exist for the “actual danger only” position among 
older state cases, but it is a minority position.  At the time of the 
adoption of the MPC, for example, three states took this approach, and 
three states had statutes which implied that the danger must have been 
real.149  However, fourteen other states made clear that the danger need 
not be real so long as the defendant’s perception of it was reasonable.150  
The American Law Institute considered this question and opted for the 
majority approach.151  Commentators describe this as the prevailing 
rule.152
As a policy matter, it would be misguided indeed to require an actual 
danger, rather than a reasonable perception of one, on the part of the 
defendant.  Consider a case in which a person jokingly but convincingly 
threatens serious bodily harm if the defendant does not immediately 
break a store window, or one in which the defendant, due to limited 
English proficiency, mistakenly understands a nonthreatening request to 
break the window as a threatening one.  On these facts, the defendant 
would not actually be under an unlawful and present threat, despite 
having reasonable grounds for believing himself to be under such a 
threat.  Would it make sense to punish the defendant’s coerced 
vandalism? 
The same analysis applies with respect to the separate duress element 
that there be no reasonable, lawful opportunity to avoid the threatened 
harm.  Consider a defendant under an actual and immediate threat who 
unknowingly passes by undercover police officers who could easily 
assist him. Or suppose a blind defendant walks right by uniformed police 
officers on his way to carry out the coercer’s unjust demands.  In point 
of fact, the defendant does have a reasonable, legal opportunity to 
disobey the coercer while avoiding bodily harm, but, through no fault of 
his own, he is unaware of that opportunity.  The point of all these 
hypotheticals is that the inquiry should not be on the actual presence or 
 149. See MPC 1985, supra note 36, § 2.09 cmt. at 370. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. § 2.09 cmt. at 375. 
 152. See LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 9.7(b), at 78 (“Doubtless . . . the danger need not 
be real; it is enough if the defendant reasonably believes it to be real”); 1 WHARTON’S 
CRIMINAL LAW § 52, at 334-35 (15th ed. 2003) (“[T]here need not be actual danger of 
harm, the actor’s reasonable belief of harm is sufficient.”). 
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absence of these duress elements, but rather whether the defendant’s 
belief that the elements are present is reasonable. 
This is the approach taken in the federal system.  Federal courts are 
generally in agreement that duress should be determined according to 
an objective standard: They agree that an unreasonable belief in the 
need to disobey the law does not suffice to establish the defense.  The 
belief in the danger, and the need for complying with the coercer’s 
unlawful demands to avoid that danger, must be “reasonable” or 
“well-founded.”153  The reasonable belief in the need to disobey the 
law to avoid serious injury is both a necessary and sufficient 
condition of the defense.  For this reason, the pattern jury instructions 
from almost all of the federal circuits include an explicit requirement 
that the defendant have a “reasonable” or “well-grounded” belief in 
the danger.154  Where that requirement is met, the defense applies.  
Most states take this view as well.155  Similarly, the MPC would 
allow a reasonable but mistaken belief in the threat to suffice for a 
claim of duress.156
While a reasonable belief in the presence of the duress elements 
should clearly be sufficient for the defense, it is by no means clear that it 
should be necessary for it.  If a defendant sincerely believes that he is in 
danger and his only safe way out is to follow the coercer’s instructions, 
 153. See, e.g., United States v. Keller, 376 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Cotto, 347 F.2d 441, 446 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Sachdev, 279 F.3d 25, 
29 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1994); United States 
v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Scott, 901 F.2d 871, 
873 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. King, 879 F.2d 137, 139 (4th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. May, 727 F.2d 764, 
765 (8th Cir. 1984).  Sounding a similar note, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized 
that the defense cannot hold “if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the 
law.”  United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980). 
 154. O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 24, at 745-71 (listing duress elements for the 
various federal circuits). 
 155. See, e.g., Nall v. Commonwealth, 271 S.W. 1059, 1059-60 (Ky. 1925); State v. 
St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Mo. 1953); State v. Van Dyke, 825 A.2d 1163, 1170 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 809 A.2d 256, 262 (Pa. 2002); 
cf. State v. B.H., 834 A.2d 1063, 1071 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (explaining that, 
since the fear must not only be reasonable but actually perceived by the defendant, that 
test has both subjective and objective components). 
 156. MPC 1985, supra note 36, § 2.09 cmt. at 380.  A “reasonableness” standard is 
central to the MPC’s definition of duress in a different manner.  The Code defines duress 
as the use or threat of such force against the accused “that a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.”  Uniform Laws, MPC, supra 
note 36, § 2.09(1), at 131. 




the defendant needs no rehabilitation and deserves no retribution for his 
mistake, even if his mistake was unreasonable.  And how would 
deterrence, either specific or general, be served by punishing him for his 
honest but unreasonable mistake?157
As with all negligence-based crimes, there is the deterrence rationale 
that the law should encourage people to be careful and to discourage a 
lack of care.  This might justify a rule which would take away a duress 
argument from persons who acted in good faith but with an unreasonable 
belief that committing an illegal act was necessary to save themselves 
from serious bodily injury.  However, such a rationale would more 
suitably justify punishing the negligent duress-perceiver in a manner 
corresponding to punishments for other negligence-based crimes, such 
as negligent destruction of property or criminally negligent homicide,  as 
opposed to punishments for serious intent-based felonies such as murder, 
kidnapping, assault, or robbery. 
This is similar to the approach taken by the MPC with respect to 
necessity and duress.  Where a defendant, otherwise eligible for the 
necessity defense, is negligent in assessing the necessity for his conduct, 
or in causing the situation giving rise to the necessity of breaking the 
law, he will be liable for a negligence-based crime.158  Correspondingly, 
where the defendant acts recklessly in assessing the necessity, or 
recklessly causes the situation giving rise to the necessity, he will be 
liable for any recklessness-based crime.159  Thus, the punishment is 
proportionate to the actual culpability of the defendant. 
The MPC rule regarding duress is similar, with one exception.  Where 
a defendant otherwise eligible for the duress defense is negligent in 
placing himself in a situation likely to result in the duress, the defendant 
will be liable for a negligence-based crime.160  This is analogous to the 
MPC rule on necessity.  However, if the defendant is reckless in placing 
himself under the duress, the defense is completely unavailable, and the 
defendant can be convicted even of intent-based crimes committed under 
the duress.161  In its commentaries on the MPC, the American Law 
Institute acknowledges that this rule is an exception to its general 
approach of matching offense liability with the actual level of mens rea 
held by the defendant: It allows conviction of a crime of purpose where 
 157. Granted, applying such a subjective duress standard to a serious offense like 
homicide may seem unduly lenient.  But applied to minor offenses like the window-breaking 
hypotheticals above, this kind of subjective standard seems more tenable. 
 158. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(2), at 42-43 (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 
1985). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at § 2.09(2), at 37. 
 161. Id. 
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the actor’s culpability was limited to recklessness.162  It was thought the 
rule would apply mostly to “persons who connect themselves with 
criminal activities, in which case it would be very difficult to assess 
claims of duress.”163  Generally, the harsher treatment was justified by 
the difference in mere “inadvertence” and the more serious “conscious 
risk creation” involved in recklessness.164
Although the MPC is not completely consistent in matching liability 
to culpability, its general preference for such proportionality is sound. 
The best approach to the objective versus subjective debate would be 
that recklessness or negligence in misperceiving the power or 
imminence of the threat, or the availability of reasonable alternatives to 
obeying the threat, should result in liability for recklessness-based or 
negligence-based crimes, as the case may be.  Failing that, the current 
state of the law reaches an acceptable compromise in holding that a 
reasonable belief in a sufficiently powerful coercive threat is both 
necessary and sufficient. 
B.  The “Objective” Standard and Individual Defendant Characteristics 
Establishing that a “reasonable defendant standard” applies, and that it 
allows for reasonable mistakes by defendants, does not end the inquiry.  
In applying this standard, what individual characteristics of the 
defendant, if any, may a court or jury consider?  For example, if the 
defendant is twelve years old, do we judge his perception of the danger 
from the standard of a generic reasonable defendant, or a reasonable 
twelve-year-old defendant?  What if the defendant is retarded, like 
Terance Johnson? 
1.  Sixth Circuit Opinion 
The Sixth Circuit in the Terance Johnson case ruled that evidence of 
the defendant’s mental retardation was not relevant to the duress 
defense.165  Thus, neither psychiatric testimony offered by the defendant, 
nor any other testimony regarding the nature and extent of the 
 162. MPC 1985, supra note 36, § 2.09 cmt. at 379 & n.48. 
 163. Id. at 379. 
 164. Id. at 380. 
 165. United States v. Johnson (Terance Johnson), 416 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 
2005). 




defendant’s intellectual impairments, could be introduced.166  In its 
three-paragraph discussion of this issue, the Court cited two reasons for 
its conclusion .167
First, the Sixth Circuit rejected any analogy to a “physical debilitation” 
like “blindness, deafness, partial paralysis, a missing limb, or the 
like.”168  Mental retardation, the Court held, is more “difficult to 
identify, more difficult to quantify, and more easily feigned.”169  The 
Court cited no authority—legal, medical, or otherwise—for this 
empirical assertion (for which there was neither argument nor evidence 
in the record).  It did cite the common-law civil tort rule that “an adult 
suffering from a mental deficiency is nevertheless held to a reasonable 
person standard.”170 
This analysis is incomplete in several respects.  First, the line between 
mental retardation and “physical” disabilities is overstated and out of 
date.  The modern medical understanding of retardation characterizes it 
as an identifiable condition with physiological causes and manifestations.  
The known causes for the varieties of mental retardation are trauma, 
toxins, metabolic disorders, prenatal or neonatal nutritional deficiencies, 
infectious diseases, or genetic conditions.171  While there are many 
different causes, they all manifest in a “common pathway of various 
pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous 
system.”172  The onset must occur before age eighteen, and the effect is 
permanent—one does not “get over” being retarded.173  The condition is 
rare, with less than three percent of the population classified as 
retarded.174
Retardation is far from being difficult to identify or quantify.  A 
subject with an I.Q. of seventy or below is considered mentally retarded 
if she also manifests significant limitations in certain identified 
 166. Id. at 470 (affirming district court ruling excluding such evidence). 
 167. Id. at 469. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b (1965)). 
 171. See, e.g., MEDLINE PLUS MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA: MENTAL RETARDATION, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001523.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).  
Indeed, the record in the Terance Johnson case contains undisputed testimony that 
Terance Johnson suffered prenatal drug abuse by his mother and physical abuse by his 
father against the fetus while his mother was pregnant with him.  Joint Appendix at     
93-94, Terance Johnson, 416 F.3d 464 (No. 04-5611). 
 172. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002) (citing DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed., Text Revision 2000)) 
[hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]) 
 173. Id. at 308, 309 n.5 (citing MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, 
AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992)). 
 174. Id. at 309 n.5 (citing 2 KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY 2592 (B. Sadock & V. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000)). 
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“adaptive functions” such as communication, self-care, or interpersonal 
skills.175  Indeed, courts have identified recognized I.Q. tests, and uniformly 
use the I.Q. score of seventy as the cutoff for retardation.176  A similar 
cutoff is used by the Social Security Administration in determining who 
is qualified for disability benefits.177  Most experts testify that retardation 
cannot be feigned.178  Courts have much experience in determining who 
is or is not mentally retarded.  Indeed, in the Terance Johnson case, the 
defendant’s mentally retarded status was undisputed. 
Also out of date is the reliance on common-law civil tort principles as 
codified in the Second Restatement of Torts.  The medical understanding of 
mental retardation has changed since 1965, when the Second Restatement 
was published.  The Restatement of Torts drafters are now actively 
considering a rule recognizing the salience of a mental or emotional 
disability which has a clear “organic cause.”179  Such disabilities, like 
mental retardation, may be considered more physical than mental.  And the 
common law in other civil causes of action is even more receptive to 
consideration of mental retardation, as contract cases considering duress 
defenses show.180  At any rate, since the primary purpose of civil law is to 
compensate the plaintiff rather than punish the defendant, and the civil 
defendant’s liberty is not at stake, a defendant-strict standard in civil law 
should by no means close the inquiry. 
Second, the Sixth Circuit noted that a “reasonable retarded person” 
standard is “unknown to our criminal jurisprudence, state or federal.”181  
Such a standard, reasoned the court, would “collapse into a subjective, 
individualized inquiry in each case.”182  Further, it would require a jury 
to undertake the impossible task of determining which lawful 
alternatives a defendant subjectively considered before deciding to obey 
the coercer’s unlawful demands.183
 175. Id. at 308 n.3 (citing DSM-IV-TR, supra note 172, at 42). 
 176. Id. at 309 n.5 (citing KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 174, at 2591-92). 
 177. See id. at 309 n.5. 
 178. This was the consistent testimony of the defense and prosecution medical 
experts in the Terance Johnson case.  Joint Appendix at 95, United States v. Johnson, 
416 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5611); see, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5 (noting 
in one instance of expert testimony that an I.Q. score of fifty-nine was not an 
“aberration” or “malingered result”). 
 179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF  TORTS, § 11 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). 
 180. See infra Part V.B.6. 
 181. Terance Johnson, 416 F.3d at 469. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 




This analysis is also incomplete.  It is not necessary to christen a 
formal “reasonable retarded person” standard for duress to allow 
consideration of the fact that the defendant is retarded and has a 
significantly impaired ability to assess threats and consider lawful 
alternatives.  More important, the reason such a consideration is “unknown 
to criminal jurisprudence” is simply that no court has had to deal with 
the issue before.  Citing an absence of precedent for a question of first 
impression is dangerously close to circular reasoning. 
Moreover, consideration of the retarded status of the defendant would 
not in fact require a subjective inquiry.  The inquiry would still be an 
objective one.  The jury would not have to guess what alternatives the 
defendant actually considered.  Rather, it would have to consider whether it 
was objectively reasonable to expect a retarded defendant, with a 
diminished ability to consider alternatives, to come up with safe, lawful 
alternative courses of action under those circumstances.  The extent of a 
retarded defendant’s diminished ability to assess threats and consider 
alternatives would be indicated through expert testimony.  Such an 
inquiry would indeed require an “individualized inquiry in each case,” 
but that is true with every jury question involving an objective standard.  
Indeed, it is the very function of the jury to make such “individualized” 
determinations. 
Like the question of the applicability of the duress defense to felony 
murder charges, the relevance of mental retardation to the duress defense is 
also a question of first impression in the federal system.  No state or federal 
court prior to the Terance Johnson case had ruled on whether evidence of 
the defendant’s mental retardation is relevant to a claim of duress.  Nor has 
any court ruled on whether other biographical characteristics, such as the 
defendant’s age or gender, can be relevant to the duress defense.  The 
closest federal authorities available are criminal cases dealing with the 
admissibility of various types of psychiatric evidence other than retardation, 
or cases considering retardation in related contexts such as coercive 
interrogations. 
2.  In General 
Generally, as long as a defendant is legally sane, the fact that he suffers 
from mental retardation will not by itself excuse him from responsibility 
for his criminal conduct.184  This characteristic distinguishes retarded 
defendants from juvenile defendants, who, depending on their exact age, 
 184. See James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal 
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 432-35 (1985). 
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are often presumed not responsible for their criminal acts.185  Because 
medical testimony concerning the mentally retarded often speaks of the 
retarded as having the intellectual capacity of a child, an analogy 
between the two seems natural enough.  However, arguments to treat 
retarded defendants like child defendants in this manner have been 
“universally unsuccessful.”186
Deciding that mental retardation does not per se excuse a criminal 
defendant is not the same as deciding that evidence of the defendant’s 
mental retardation cannot be relevant.  Indeed, as part of a “diminished 
capacity” defense, some states allow consideration of this evidence in 
determining whether the defendant in fact acted with the requisite mens 
rea, while others either prohibit such evidence, or limit its consideration 
to murder cases.187  Federal courts recognize a diminished capacity 
defense to homicide and other crimes, including the ability to introduce 
psychiatric evidence regarding a defendant’s mental impairments, but 
only to negate a “specific intent” element.188  Indeed, this rule of law 
arose during the Terance Johnson case.  Prior to ruling that evidence of 
defendant’s mental retardation was irrelevant to the duress defense, the 
 185. Id. at 434-35. 
 186. Id. at 435.  A similar distinction is made in tort law.  Courts hearing civil 
negligence claims generally hold children to the standard of a reasonable child of the 
corresponding age.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965).  Tort 
law also generally allows consideration of a party’s physical disability, but not of a 
mental or emotional disability.  See id. § 283C, § 283C cmt. b.  The distinction is based 
at least in part on concerns that mental or emotional disabilities, and their causal effect 
on the tortious conduct, are harder to prove, define, and quantify.  See id.  Blurring the 
distinction somewhat is the rule that involuntary intoxication can be taken into account 
in deciding the standard of care.  Id. § 283C cmt. d.  Moreover, courts have recently 
begun to consider the salience of a mental or emotional disability which has a “clear 
organic cause.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, § 11 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2001).  Such disabilities might be considered more physical than mental.  With each 
passing year, medical science discovers physiological roots for ailments once thought to 
be purely psychological in nature, further blurring the line.  Of course, given that tort 
law’s primary purpose is to ensure that those who are wrongfully injured receive 
compensation, rather than to punish those deserving of punishment, tort law is not the 
best area in which to seek guidance.  For more information on tort law’s reluctance to 
take mental disabilities into account, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND 
FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 57-59 (2002). 
 187. DRESSLER, supra note 35, § 26.02, at 363-65; see supra Part III.D. (describing 
the use of “diminished capacity” to mitigate murder to manslaughter). 
 188. See, e.g., United States v. Ettinger, 344 F.3d 1149, 1152 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Twine, 
853 F.2d 676, 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1988); Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1256-57 
(7th Cir. 1978). 




district court had ruled it irrelevant to a defense of diminished capacity, 
because the felony murder theory at issue was not a “specific intent” 
type of offense.189
Only recently, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the special status of 
the mentally retarded in the criminal law, invalidating the execution of 
the mentally retarded.190  In so ruling, the Court emphasized that the 
mentally retarded have, “by definition . . . diminished capacities to 
understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from 
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to 
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.”191  
Commentators have echoed this emphasis, noting that the mentally 
retarded have characteristics making them uniquely vulnerable to 
coercion.192  Thus, a mentally retarded defendant may have a compromised 
ability to assess whether a threat is real or imminent, to decide whether 
obeying the coercer’s unlawful command is truly necessary, and to 
conceive of and weigh alternative responses to the coercer in order to 
decide whether there is a reasonable opportunity to avoid the harm 
without acceding to the coercer’s demands.  Further, this lessened ability 
to meet the elements of the duress defense is something beyond the 
defendant’s control, based on a permanent disability.  Should a jury be 
informed of this before it assesses the defendant’s duress defense?  To 
help answer this question, we should look at what other courts have said 
in analogous situations. 
3.  Federal Cases on Duress 
While there are no federal opinions directly addressing this issue, 
federal appellate courts dealing with claims of duress have on at least 
two occasions noted without criticism the admission of such evidence at 
the trial court level.193  In the analogous context of claims that a 
 189. See, e.g., Knox v. State, 901 So.2d 1257, 1268 (Miss. 2005); McConnell v. 
State, 107 P.3d 1287, 1292 (Nev. 2005); State v. Ammons, 2005 WL 1378775, at *4 
(Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2005). 
 190. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 191. Id. at 318. 
 192. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, 
Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 511-12 (2002) 
(the retarded are “unusually susceptible to the perceived wishes of authority figures” and 
have “a generalized desire to please”); Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary 
Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2044 (1998) (the “mentally handicapped” 
are “especially vulnerable” to the pressures of custodial interrogation). 
 193. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 274 (1989) (describing how lower court, 
considering defendant’s duress defense to a rape charge, admitted evidence that 
defendant was “mildly retarded” and “could be easily influenced by others”); Bliss v. 
Lockhart, 891 F.2d 1335, 1340, 1343 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding grant of habeas relief in 
sexual assault case, where evidence showed defendant, who had been under duress from 
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confession was the product of unconstitutional duress, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has noted that a suspect’s “mental condition” is “surely relevant to 
an individual’s susceptibility to police coercion.”194  For that reason, 
federal courts have held that when the interrogating police know that a 
suspect suffers from some “mental incapacity,” including, specifically, 
mental retardation, a lesser quantum of coercion is necessary to 
invalidate a confession.195
An analogous issue arose in the decades-old case of United States v. 
Hearst, a famous case involving a duress defense to bank robbery 
charges.196  There, the Ninth Circuit ruled psychiatric testimony was 
admissible to prove the defendant’s claim (who was not mentally 
retarded or emotionally disturbed) that she had been coerced into 
participating in the bank robberies.197
4.  Federal Cases on “Battered Women’s Syndrome” 
The more recent federal cases which have issued rulings on anything 
analogous to a duress defense for a mental condition have dealt with the 
issue of “battered women’s syndrome.”  In United States v. Johnson,198 
the Ninth Circuit considered the relevance of evidence that the female 
defendants, low-level members of a drug ring, had developed battered 
women’s syndrome through repeated beatings at the hands of the drug 
ring’s bodyguards, enforcers, and collectors.199  The court ruled that 
a domineering and abusive husband, was retarded and functioned on an eight-year-old 
level). 
 194. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986).  Connelly concerned a 
mentally ill defendant, but the logic also applies to someone with mental retardation.  See 
Cloud et al., supra note 192, at 511-12 (detailing how the retarded are unusually 
susceptible to coercive interrogation techniques); White, supra note 192, at 2044 (same). 
 195. Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 682 (6th Cir. 2002); Nickel v. Hannigan, 97 
F.3d 403, 410 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sablotny, 21 F.3d 747, 751-52 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
 196. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977).  The case involved the 
famed daughter of newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst, the basis for the 
award-winning motion picture Citizen Kane.  Patricia Hearst’s apparent abduction by a 
radical domestic terrorist group called the Symbionese Liberation Army became a 
nationwide cause celebre.  Public interest in the case grew greater still after she appeared 
to be participating in bank robberies conducted by the radical group.  Her eventual 
apprehension (or rescue, depending on one’s point of view) sparked a national debate on 
whether persons could be “brainwashed.”  See CHRISTOPHER CASTIGLIA, BOUND AND 
DETERMINED 88-90, 97-99 (1996). 
 197. Hearst, 563 F.2d at 1336, 1343. 
 198. United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 199. Id. at 897-903. 




evidence of a defendant’s “special vulnerability” to coercion could be 
relevant to a duress defense.200  It explained that any experiences the 
defendants had which affected the defendants’ anticipation that threats 
would be carried out could be considered in evaluating the duress element 
that the fear of the coercer be “well-grounded.”201
In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the MPC.  The federal 
duress elements of a “well-grounded fear” and no “reasonable” opportunity 
to escape were “in harmony” with the MPC’s standard that “a person of 
reasonable firmness in [the actor’s] situation would have been unable to 
resist.”202  The court quoted the MPC commentary’s explanation that while 
the individual temperament of a defendant could not be considered in 
applying this “reasonable firmness” standard, one could nonetheless 
consider “[s]tark, tangible factors that differentiate the actor from another, 
like his size, strength, age, or health.”203 The Ninth Circuit then added 
gender to the list of such “stark, tangible factors.”204  While cautioning 
against any “substantial expansion of the [duress] defense . . . [unless] 
linked to gross and identifiable classes of circumstances,” it concluded that 
battered women formed such a class.205  It was therefore permissible to 
consider an individual defendant’s “experience and psychological 
makeup.”206  Given that mental retardation is a more well-recognized and 
well-defined condition than the more recent and more controversial battered 
women’s syndrome, Johnson would seem to support consideration of a 
defendant’s retardation where the defendant claims coercion.  Retardation 
fits into the gross and identifiable class of circumstances mentioned in 
Johnson. 
Other circuits have cited Johnson on this ground, with mixed results.  
In United States v. Sachdev,207 the First Circuit cited Johnson in the 
analogous context of a downward Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
departure for duress: “There may be room to consider whether a 
 200. Id. at 897-908. 
 201. Id. at 898. 
 202. Id. (quoting MPC 1985, supra note 36, § 2.09(i)). 
 203. Id. (quoting MPC 1985, supra note 36, § 2.09 cmt. 3). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 900. 
 206. Id.; see also People v. Sanchez, 446 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (Sup. Ct. 1982) 
(testimony concerning “the intelligence level of the defendant” would aid the jury in 
determining his ability “to resist acts or threats of duress which could affect his conduct”); 
State v. Woods, 357 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (Ohio 1976) (in evaluating duress defense to 
murder case, the question is not “what effect such conduct would have upon an ordinary 
man but rather the effect upon the particular person toward whom such conduct is directed, 
and in determining such effect the age, sex, health, and mental condition of the person 
affected . . . may be considered”); State v. Williams, 937 P.2d 1052, 1058 (Wash. 1997) 
(individual defendant’s experience of abuse could overcome weakness regarding the 
immediacy of the coercer’s threat). 
 207. United States v. Sachdev, 279 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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defendant falls into a group well recognized to have particular 
vulnerability to coercion or duress . . . such as those suffering from 
battered person’s syndrome.”208  While this decision is open to the 
consideration of mental impairment even under an “objective” standard 
of duress, its salience is limited in that it arose only in the context of 
sentencing. 
In United States v. Smith,209 the Second Circuit referenced Johnson and 
quoted the MPC section 2.09 standard of a “person of reasonable 
firmness.”210  The court appeared to agree with the district court’s ruling 
that psychiatric testimony regarding the defendant’s “unusual susceptibility 
to coercion” was not relevant to the duress defense, but only for sentencing 
purposes.211  However, the court also stated that psychiatric testimony 
should have been allowed on the question of whether the defendant’s 
individual behavior was consistent with duress—even though there was no 
evidence or claim that the defendant suffered from some mental or 
emotional defect.212  It is not clear what the Second Circuit would say about 
the admissibility of psychiatric evidence where such a defect (such as 
retardation) was in fact present. 
The Fifth Circuit developed a clearer but more restrictive view in 
United States v. Willis.213  In Willis, the circuit court held that evidence 
of the defendant’s battered women’s syndrome would not be admissible 
for duress claims, because duress was a purely “objective” test.214  The 
court in Willis correctly interpreted the Second Circuit decision in Smith 
as in accord with its own.215  However, the Second Circuit incorrectly 
interpreted the Ninth Circuit opinion in Johnson as being in accord with 
its decision as well.216  To the extent it suggests that psychological 
 208. Id. at 29 n.2; see also State v. B.H., 834 A.2d 1063, 1071 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2003) (finding that the standard for duress would be “the reasonable person 
suffering from battered women’s syndrome as a result of a history of battering”). 
 209. United States v. Smith, 987 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 210. Id. at 890-91. 
 211. Id. at 891-92. 
 212. Id. at 891. 
 213. United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 214. Id. at 176-77. 
 215. Id. at 176. 
 216. Id.  In Willis, the Fifth Circuit read the Ninth Circuit’s Johnson opinion as 
holding that evidence of battered women’s syndrome could be relevant only at 
sentencing.  Id.  It is true that the Ninth Circuit noted as a procedural matter that the case 
was before it only as to sentencing.  United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d at 897.  
However, the court in Johnson also made several approving references linking battered 
women’s syndrome to MPC commentaries on duress which dealt explicitly with the 




ailments of the individual defendant cannot be considered, Willis 
represents authority against the relevance of defendant’s retardation.  On 
the other hand, because battered women’s syndrome is a newer, more 
controversial condition than mental retardation, and one less clearly 
defined and quantified, Willis is arguably distinguishable.   
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance in Johnson on the MPC, particularly the 
“stark, tangible factors” language, is instructive.  State courts have relied 
upon the same language, and in one case allowed evidence of the 
defendant’s mental retardation for a claim of duress.  In Commonwealth v. 
DeMarco,217 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania construed Pennsylvania’s 
duress statute, which followed the MPC language of “a person of 
reasonable firmness in the defendant’s situation.”218  The court quoted the 
“stark, tangible factors” language from the MPC commentaries and 
concluded that while a court cannot consider a defendant’s “particular 
characteristics of temperament, intelligence, courageousness, or moral 
fortitude,” it could consider the fact that a defendant suffers from a “gross 
and verifiable mental disability.”219  Thus, it allowed consideration of the 
defendant’s borderline mental retardation.220  Other state court decisions 
have followed a similar path.221  This is consistent with the general 
approach of allowing evidence of a defendant’s physical disabilities to be 
considered regarding “reasonableness” standards.  On the other hand, in 
State v. Van Dyke, an intermediate appellate court in New Jersey quoted 
the same “stark, tangible factors” language and concluded that evidence of 
a defendant’s “mental health” had properly been excluded from jury 
consideration.222
question of guilt.  See id. at 898, 900 (referring to the “stark, tangible factors” language 
and explaining how “the continued use of unlawful force . . . break[s] down the 
personality” of the [defendant], rendering [her] “submissive”).  The court then 
recognized battered women as a “gross and identifiable class[]” and linked that class to 
an “expansion of the defense” of duress.  Id. at 900.  Finally, by way of analogy, the 
court approvingly discussed cases recognizing the subjugation of abused women, which 
involved determinations of liability, not sentencing.  Id. (citing Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 
F.2d 1432, 1434 (5th Cir. 1987) and United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602, 605 (9th 
Cir. 1984)).  Thus, I read Johnson as endorsing the relevance of battered women’s 
syndrome evidence in evaluating a duress defense at the guilt or innocence phase as well 
as the sentencing phase. 
 217. Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 809 A.2d 256 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted). 
 218. Id. at 262. 
 219. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.09 cmt. at 7 (Tentative Draft No. 10) 
(1960)). 
 220. Id. at 263; see also Tully v. State, 730 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1986) (describing how trial testimony included psychological profile of defendant as 
easily manipulated and terrified by coercer). 
 221. See, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 446 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (noting 
that evidence of mental retardation would aid the jury in determining “the ability of the 
defendant to resist” threats). 
 222. State v. Van Dyke, 825 A.2d 1163, 1170-72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). 
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According to the MPC, consideration of the “stark, tangible factors” 
of the defendant’s “situation” under section 2.09 can also include both 
age and health.223  Mental retardation involves elements of both age and 
health.  Mentally retarded defendants are often diagnosed as having the 
mental age of a child.224  And mental retardation is certainly a medical 
condition which falls within the category of “health.” 
5.  Cases Involving Criminal Negligence 
An obvious analogy would be that of criminal negligence, normally 
defined as a gross deviation from the standard of care of a reasonable 
person.  Would evidence of a defendant’s mental retardation be 
relevant for a jury deciding guilt of a defendant charged with a 
criminal negligence-based offense?  Little case law exists on this 
question.  One Alaska decision has stated that the “peculiarities of a 
given individual—his or her intelligence, experience, and physical 
capabilities” are irrelevant to the question of criminal negligence 
“since the standard is one of the reasonably prudent person.”225  The 
court specifically used as examples mental retardation, bad eyesight, 
and bad hearing as conditions which would be irrelevant as a matter of 
law to determining criminal negligence.226  A Connecticut Supreme 
Court decision hints at a similar result, specifying that outside the 
context of an insanity defense,  evidence of a defendant’s mental 
capacity would be relevant to the issue of whether defendant acted 
recklessly, or to any other “specific intent” element.227  This might be 
read as implying that such evidence would be irrelevant to a 
determination of whether the defendant was negligent, or acted 
reasonably, as would be the case with the key elements of the duress 
defense. 
However, the MPC takes a different approach.  The MPC explicitly 
states that criminal negligence is to be judged according to the “care that 
 223. MPC 1985, supra note 36, § 2.09, at 375. 
 224. See, e.g., Terance Johnson Sentencing Order, supra note 2, at 6 (finding, based 
on psychiatric testimony, that Terance Johnson has an intellectual and emotional age 
between six and ten years).  This similarity may not justify giving mentally retarded 
defendants the same presumption of incapacity which children receive.  See supra Part 
V.B.1.  However, the two seem sufficiently analogous that they ought to be treated in 
parallel when applying the defense of duress. 
 225. Edgmon v. State, 702 P.2d 643, 645 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 226. Id. 
 227. State v. Burge, 487 A.2d 532, 539 (Conn. 1985). 




a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”228  In 
interpreting the word “situation,” the MPC commentaries distinguish 
between significant disabilities such as a defendant who is blind, 
experiences a heart attack, or has just suffered a blow, from mere matters 
of individual temperament or intelligence.229  Although there are no 
major cases in MPC jurisdictions which directly apply this distinction to 
mental retardation, it seems that mental retardation resembles the 
disabilities mentioned above more than an instance of individual 
temperament or intelligence.230  While the MPC commentaries might be 
read to favor consideration of retardation, the two reported decisions 
dealing with criminal negligence discussed above point in the opposite 
direction.231
6.  Duress as an Excuse for Contract Liability 
Another obvious analogy comes from contract law.  The law has long 
recognized a duress defense to contract liability.  If a party to a contract 
was induced to enter into the contract through physical, psychological, 
or even economic coercion, the party can rely on such coercion to 
excuse himself or herself from liability.232  Where the coercion is 
nonphysical in nature, the level of pressure required is “an improper 
threat . . . that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative” to entering 
into the contract.233
While reported cases on the issue do not abound, it appears that courts 
adjudicating contract disputes consider evidence of the defendant’s 
mental impairment a relevant factor when weighing a claim of duress 
(sometimes also referred to as “undue influence”).234  These cases reflect 
consideration of the duress defense as distinct from the related contract 
law defense of lack of capacity to enter a contract, as would arise where 
the party seeking relief was a minor or mentally incompetent.235  Of 
 228. MPC 1985, supra note 36, § 2.02(d), at 226. 
 229. Id. § 2.02 cmt. at 242. 
 230. But cf. Edgmon, 702 P.2d at 645 (stating in dicta in non-MPC jurisdiction that 
defendant’s retardation would not be relevant to criminal negligence but would be 
relevant to a recklessness mens rea). 
 231. Id. at 645; Burge, 487 A.2d at 539. 
 232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 174-175 (1979). 
 233. Id. § 175(1). 
 234. See, e.g., Russo v. Miller, 559 A.2d 354, 358 (Me. 1989) (seller’s personal 
susceptibility to duress, heightened by the mental incapacity evidenced by her history of 
psychiatric treatment, combined with other factors to unduly influence the seller); 
Eckstein v. Eckstein, 379 A.2.d 757, 764-65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (considering 
wife’s mental and emotional illness in voiding a divorce decree executed under duress). 
 235. See Russo, 559 A.2d at 358. 
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course, mental disability is always relevant in deciding whether a party 
had the capacity to enter into a contract or to write a will.   
A somewhat analogous contract case involving a claim of economic 
coercion lends support to this view.  In Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. 
v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.,236 the court analyzed whether a given 
amount of fiscal pressure would be sufficient to support a contract 
defense of duress.  The court allowed evidence of the shaky financial 
status of Totem Marine to show that it was particularly vulnerable to 
economic coercion by the much larger Alyeska Corporation.237
7.  Policy Considerations 
In sum, there is no federal case law directly on point, and all 
analogous case law is in conflict.  There is undeniably room for 
argument.  In my view, the best approach is to allow consideration of the 
defendant’s mental retardation, as well as other recognized mental and 
emotional disorders.  Mental retardation profoundly compromises an 
accused’s ability to decide whether a threat is real and imminent, and 
whether a reasonable alternative exists to heeding it—probably the two 
most important elements of the duress defense.  In criminal law, it is 
simply unfair to hold a defendant to a standard which he is not capable 
of meeting. 
A reasonable contrary argument would distinguish duress from other 
excuse defenses like diminished capacity or insanity.  A diminished 
capacity or insanity defense says, in effect, that there is something 
wrong with the defendant that justifies treating him or her more 
leniently.  The theory of duress, however, is that any person under the 
same external circumstances would act similarly.  This theory may 
suggest a rule admitting no special considerations for individual 
defendants, no deviations from the platonic ideal of the generic 
“reasonable person.” 
But some of the same duress hypotheticals used earlier to illustrate the 
need to allow for reasonable mistakes by defendants also serve to 
illustrate the problem with this argument.  If a person with limited 
English proficiency misunderstood a joking threat as a serious one, we 
would need to take her linguistic handicap into account to properly 
assess whether her fear was “well-grounded.”  Similarly, if a blind 
 236. 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1978). 
 237. Id. at 22-24. 




person failed to see uniformed police officers next to her as she walked 
to the bank, we would need to take her blindness into account in 
deciding whether she failed to avail herself of a “reasonable 
opportunity” to avoid having to obey the unlawful demand.  In both 
cases, there is a “stark, tangible factor” (as the MPC commentaries 
would put it) or a “gross, identifiable class of circumstances” (as the 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Johnson would put it) which renders the 
defendant incapable of meeting the standard of an ordinary American.  
Basic considerations of justice thus argue for allowing the jury to 
consider the hypothetical defendants’ blindness and limited English 
proficiency.  In my view, there is no principled distinction between these 
situations and the case of a defendant (like Terance Johnson) who is 
indisputably mentally retarded.  In other words, if we allow “circumstances” 
to include the fact that the defendant is blind, or a foreigner, or retarded, 
then we can indeed say that an ordinary reasonable person under the 
same circumstances would act the same way, and the theoretical 
objection evaporates. 
Ultimately, we should imagine a continuum of causes potentially 
affecting our application of an objective “reasonableness” standard for 
duress.  At one end are matters of individual temperament: the unusually 
cowardly person, the unusually impulsive person, the unusually 
nonobservant person, etc.  These idiosyncratic characteristics may indeed 
affect a defendant’s decisions in ways relevant to a duress defense.  The 
coward may give in to unlawful demands where the threat is more 
unclear, more remote, or simply less scary than would a “normal” 
person.  Similarly, the impulsive defendant may jump to the conclusion 
that he must follow the unlawful demands, and the nonobservant person 
may fail to see fairly obvious ways out of the dilemma.  Both MPC and 
non-MPC jurisdictions would agree that such idiosyncratic characteristics 
should not be considered in excusing defendants under the duress 
defense.  For one thing, such concepts as “unusually cowardly” are ill-
defined; for another, they are by and large matters within our control.238  
Moreover, considering such highly individualized personality flaws 
erodes any notion of an objective standard in the law to which all 
persons must aspire. 
 238. I do not argue that retarded persons have less courage than the ordinary 
reasonable person.  Retardation primarily compromises cognitive skills, and may not 
have any effect at all on a person’s general strength of will.  Rather, the focus is on the 
elements of duress which directly involve cognitive functions: the ability to assess 
whether a threat is real, serious, and imminent, and the ability to assess whether there are 
reasonable, safe, and lawful alternatives to carrying out the coercer’s unlawful demands.  
Jurors should consider a duress defendant’s retardation only insofar as the cognitive 
disability affects those two elements of the duress defense. 
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At the other extreme are the notions of extreme age and extreme 
physical disability.  A seven-year-old and a frail ninety-three-year-old 
may very well be less able to resist intimidation and coercion, or nimbly 
escape the coercer’s clutches.  A blind person may be unable to see that 
the coercer’s threat is hollow.  A paraplegic may be physically less able 
to escape the coercer.  If called upon to decide, most jurisdictions would 
likely allow such biographical characteristics to be factored in.  They are 
well-defined matters beyond a defendant’s control.  More importantly, 
our intuitive sense of justice seems to cry out for consideration of such 
factors; the equities, if you will, favor the defendant. 
Mental retardation may lie somewhere in between these two extremes.  
While reasonable minds may differ as to which side of the line retardation 
falls, I believe it is more like the latter category than the former.  It is a 
well-defined matter, beyond the defendant’s control.  The condition of 
being retarded makes one a peculiarly vulnerable, and peculiarly inviting, 
target for the kind of intimidation and coercion contemplated in the duress 
defense.  At an intuitive level, holding a mentally retarded defendant to 
the standard of an ordinary reasonable person—a standard often 
impossible for such a defendant to meet—simply seems unjust. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although it has been around for centuries, the defense of duress is 
surprisingly ill-defined.  Basic questions concerning its contours appear 
to be unresolved.  Should the duress defense ever apply to homicide?  
Can it apply to unintentional homicides like felony murder, at least 
where the defendant played no direct role in the killing?  Does its 
“objectively reasonable” standard allow for consideration of a defendant’s 
physical disabilities?  What about mental or emotional disabilities? 
The Terance Johnson case does not resolve these questions, but 
merely dramatizes them.  Courts and legislatures should follow the 
modern trend and make clear that a sufficiently compelling defense of 
duress may be considered by a factfinder in any case, even where the 
charge is intentional homicide.  While the traditional rule shows 
admirable respect for the sanctity of human life in stating categorically 
that the act of taking an innocent life to save one’s own life can never be 
justified, it is unrealistic and overly harsh in stating that no amount of 
coercion can ever warrant leniency toward or excuse of an individual 
defendant. 
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Regarding the remaining issues, decisionmakers have a blank slate on 
which to write.  They should take care to think about the policies behind 
the analogous, traditional common-law approaches from which they 
might draw inspiration.  The law should make clear that duress may be 
asserted in cases of unintentional homicide like felony murder where the 
defendant does not choose to take an innocent life to save his own.  This 
follows logically from the basic rule that duress can serve as a defense to 
the underlying felony, and felony murder liability depends on liability 
for that underlying felony.  It also follows from the fact that the rationale 
for the rule barring duress as a homicide defense is that the defendant 
chose to take an innocent life.  Alternatively, the law should allow such 
a defense wherever the facts indicate that the defendant was not reckless 
(or perhaps not negligent) in getting involved in the underlying felony or 
creating the specific conditions which caused the victim’s death.  A 
final, least favorable alternative, used in some jurisdictions, would be to 
allow the duress to mitigate the charge to manslaughter. 
Whether applied to homicide or other crimes, the duress defense 
should take account of well-recognized physical and mental disabilities 
suffered by a defendant which affect his ability to meet the elements of 
the duress defense.  Such disabilities include mental retardation, which 
demonstrably impairs a defendant’s ability to assess threats and consider 
alternatives to obeying those threats.  As with the rule regarding duress 
and homicide, a contrary result holding a retarded defendant to an 
“ordinary reasonable person” standard would be unrealistic and unfair. 
 
